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TRANSCENDING CONVENTIONAL
SUPREMACY: A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE
S. Candice Hoke*
j udging from the numbers alone, the Supremacy Clause' has become
a primary battlefield for demarcating the boundaries of the federal
regulatory state. Over the past four Terms, for example, the United
States Supreme Court explicitly invoked the Clause in two dozen ma-
jority opinions where the validity of a state law was questioned.2 While
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School,
1983; B.A., Hollins College, 1977. Warmest thanks to my colleagues George Taylor, Tom Ross,
Bill Luneburg, Bernie Hibbitts, Arthur Hellman, and Ron Brand for graciously assisting me at
various junctures. Marian Kent, Chris Otto, and Richard Earlcy proved themselves invaluable
research assistants.
1. US. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. For the text of the Supremacy Clause, see Infra note 24.
2. During the 1987-1990 Terms, where state law was challenged, the Supreme Court invoked
the Supremacy Clause in a majority opinion in the following cases: Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2481-82 (1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft, Ill S. Ct. 2395, 2399-2400
(1991); Dennis v. Higgins, Ill S. Ct. 865, 872 (1991); Howlett v. Rose., 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2440-45
(1990); English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990); McKesson Corp. v. Division
of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (1990); North Dakota v. United States,
495 U.S. 423, 434-39 (1990); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990); Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367 (1989); ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989);
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 170 (1989); Davis v. Michigan Dcp't of
the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 819 (1989); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n.
489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 473 n.4 (1989); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S.
141, 145, 168 (1989); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 366, 369-77
(1988); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988); Volkswagenwcrk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 176. 178,
180-82, 186 (1988); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988); South Carolina v. Baker,
485 U.S. 505, 581 n.1 1 (1988); Puerto Rico Dcp't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.,
485 U.S. 495, 499 (1988); Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 396 (1988) (per curiam). The
Court also invoked the Supremacy Clause in three majority opinions concerning primarily juris-
dictional issues. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 US. 820, 823 (1990) (holding that
state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims); Tafllin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
458 (1990) (ruling that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims);
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196. 198 (1988) (holding that a district court's
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some of these cases presented federal preemption claims,3 many others
arose under one of the other theories of recovery currently recognized
as Supremacy Clause claims.4 This heightened usage of the Clause is
part of a larger trend; each decade after World War II has presented a
sharp rise in cases invoking the Clause. 5 With this expanded deploy-
decision on the merits of an action constituted a "final decision" for appeals purposes).
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, Ill S. Ct. 2476 (1991); English v. General
Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988). The term
"federal preemption" expresses the conclusion that state or local law must be disabled from opera-
tion because it conflicts with some aspect of a federal legislative scheme. In this strict sense, then,
federal statutes and their implementing regulations constitute the potentially preemptive law.
Other sources of federal law, including constitutional law, treaties, and federal common law, may
also disable and displace state and local law, but those inquiries proceed under divergent legal
principles.
4. Under current doctrine, three theories of recovery other than preemption are currently
tethered to the Clause. Spawned by McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819),
these claims are classified loosely as intergovernmental immunities. See infra notes 111-119 and
accompanying text. The Court has decided some questions that could be considered a species of
intergovernmental immunity pursuant to other statutory or constitutional provisions, See, e.g.,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, I ll S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (rejecting a claim of preemption of a state constitu-
tional provision mandating judicial retirement at age 70 under the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act; the majority opinion can be interpreted as an elaborate construction of a type of
intergovernmental immunity); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(ruling that the Tenth Amendment did not operate to bar the application of certain federal em-
ployment laws lo stafe employees; explicitly decided as a Tenth Amendment claim and not as a
Supremacy Clause intergovernmental immunity claim).
5. The Court has invoked the Supremacy Clause at a dramatic rate of increase during the
post-World War II era. The table below includes cases where the Clause was cited in either a
majority and concurring opinion, but excludes cases where the Clause was cited in only a dissent-
ing opinion.
Number of Cases
Period Invoking the Clause Average/Year
1980-89 83 8.3
1970-79 57 5.7
1960-69 40 4
1950-59 17 1.7
1946-49 5 1.25
This statistical survey of cases is on file with the Connecticut Law Review. Interestingly, even at
the height of the civil rights movement (1956-1968), when states were widely viewed to be disput-
ing the supremacy of federal law, the Court did not invoke the Clause half as often as it did
during the 1980s.
Occasionally, the Court has explicitly referred to preemption claims as "Supremacy Clause
cases." See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 579 (1979) (holding that certain federal
benefits are not subject to division by a state as community property); Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 651 (1971) (holding that a state cannot deny a driver's license based on nonpayment of
a judgment when the judgment is discharged pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Act); Swift &
Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 122 (1965) (holding that three-judge courts are not required in
Supremacy Clause cases where only federal-state statutory conflicts are involved). While discuss-
ing other legal issues, some Justices have recently referred to the Court's "Supremacy Clause
(Vol, 24:829
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ment of the Clause, one might have expected greater clarity from the
Court on the legal parameters and standards governing Supremacy
Clause claims; one might also have surmised that there would be a
commensurate interest from scholars. Unfortunately, neither has been
the case. Although certain applications of the Court's Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence have received recent attention, no attempt has
been made to assemble the larger segments of the doctrine and evalu-
ate whether they distort or facilitate the larger constitutional
structure.
It may well be that the Court's efforts to delineate and apply the
Clause are widely viewed as unproblematic. Thus, from this perspec-
tive, the paucity of scholarship is to be expected. This Article does not
acquiesce to that view, but instead seeks to identify and reconstruct the
frayed fabric of Supremacy Clause doctrine, exposing its logical incon-
sistencies and the interpretive threads that have greatly enhanced the
movement toward nationalization of regulatory power. Congress has
long been accorded the power to protect the federal government from
interference or discrimination by the states," and to exclude states from
regulatory fields. 9 But, assertedly, that power is rarely exercised explic-
cases." See Payne v. Tennessee, 11l S. Ct. 2597, 2618 n.3 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Swift & Co., 382 U.S. at 122); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia. I1I S. Ct. 2439,
2454 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. Federal preemption topics have sparked particular attention. See. e.g., William Funk. Fed-
eral and State Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal Preemption?, 16 Es.mar L i
(1985); Donald C. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A
Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARv. L REv. 96 (1987); Mary Ann
K. Bosack, Note, Cigarette Act Preemption-Refining the Analysis, 66 NY U L REv 756
(1991); James G. Kreissman, Note, Administrative Preemption in Consumer Banking Law' 73
VA. L. REV. 911 (1987); Ellen L. Theroff, Note, Preemption of Airbag Litigation: Just a Lot of
Hot Air?, 76 VA. L. REv. 577 (1990).
7. Because I focus on the role played by the Supremacy Clause in achieving a functioning
federalist government, I do not examine the Clause's role in justifying federal judicial review for
the unconstitutionality of congressional and executive action. This latter issue, of course, has been
and remains the subject of considerable academic commentary. See Infra note 66. By contrast,
few constitutional scholars have paid any sustained attention to the Supremacy Clause's other
facets. Prominent exceptions include Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605 (1981). and Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUbt. L. REV. 489 (1954).
8. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (ruling, inter alia, that a state
cannot regulate-a congressionally-created federal instrumentality).
9. ERISA's express preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). has engendered exten-
sive litigation. See. e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that a
state statute mandating severance benefits in the event of a plant closing is not a wVelfare benefit
plan and thus is not preempted); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (in-
validating as preempted a state statute that prohibited offsetting worker's compensation payments
1992)
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itly. Instead, and analogous to its efforts under the dormant Commerce
Clause,'0 the federal judiciary has constructed an elaborate legal de-
fault, subsumed as intergovernmental immunities and implied federal
preemption. Doctrinally appended to the Clause, these judicially fash-
ioned doctrines fortify the centripetal, nationalizing pressures." In ad-
dition to effecting greater centralization of power, a portion of the
Court's Supremacy Clause doctrine is founded upon antagonistic theo-
retical conceptions of the Clause. More specifically, the Court's fre-
quent labeling of federal preemption claims as "Supremacy Clause
cases ' u2 contradicts other doctrines denying constitutional status to
these claims, and obscures the purpose the Clause serves in the larger
constitutional structure.
Perhaps because the predominant strands of contemporary
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence originate in two of the most venerable
cases in the Court's history, the Court and academics alike have side-
stepped some of their problematic pronouncements. In Part I, this Arti-
cle questions the legacy of McCulloch v. Maryland13 and Gibbons v.
Ogden, 4 finding their Supremacy Clause principles unacceptably na-
tionalistic and hence unfaithful to the balance of the Constitution.
While their centralizing tendencies may have been understandable dur-
against pension benefits).
10. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125.
11. Scholarly and popular dissent from the established trend toward ever greater centraliza-
tion of political and regulatory power spans left-wing, right-wing, and centrist political philoso-
phies. See, e.g., GAR ALPEROVITZ & JEFF FAUX. REBUILDING AMERICA 79-80 (1984) (recom-
mending an economic strategy that is consistent with and accountable to decentralized political
power); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 278-89 (1983) (arguing citizens
can best come to understand their interests and realize the values of community in small democra-
cies); James M. Buchanan, Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals, 68 Am. ECON. ASS'N J.
364 (1978) (calling for a "constitutional revolution" that would produce a dramatic devolution of
power; contends the need arises from diminishing moral sensibility that can be partially traced to
loss of community and local political power); Cf. SAUL D. ALINSKY. RULES FOR RADICALS (1971)
(advocating grassroots urban activism to improve lives of ordinary people); SI KAHN, ORGANIZ-
ING: A GUIDE FOR GRASSROOTS LEADERS (1982) (elaborating means by which average people can
become politically powerful for progressive causes at local levels of government). Prominent legal
theorists who also advocate decentralization of power include Gerald Frug, Kathryn Abrams, Paul
Brest, and Frank Michelman. See GERALD FRUG. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW at xv (1988);
Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988); Paul Brest, Further Beyond
the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623 (1988); Gerald
Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 559 (1989); Frank Michelman, Law's Re-
public, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
12. See supra note 5.
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
[Vol. 24:829
HeinOnline  -- 24 Conn. L. Rev. 832 1991-1992
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
ing the nation's infancy, their raison d'atre has evaporated; the pendu-
lum of state versus national regulatory power on matters other than
individual liberties has swung too far. My objective is not to argue that
all intergovernmental immunities are unjustified, or that federal pre-
emption of state law is unauthorized. Rather, my focus throughout cen-
ters on whether these substantive claims are properly conceptualized as
flowing from the Supremacy Clause. Part I also seeks to expose certain
other analytic and textual difficulties that pervade the Court's
Supremacy Clause cases.
Part II examines the Constitutional Convention records to assist in
formulating the Clause's proper function in the larger plan and in elab-
orating any limitations that deserve recognition. It concludes that the
historical records support a narrow but important function for the
Clause. Contrary to the Court's jurisprudence, the Clause's process-
based regulative purpose is distorted by appending original claims to it.
It cannot be properly read to confer additional national powers irre-
spective of the substantive provisions and limitations articulated in the
balance of the Constitution.
Despite the current Court's professed solicitude for the fate of fed-
eralism, it has thus far not attended to the fray of threads that consti-
tute Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. Part III extricates the sound
doctrinal strands and weaves them with the historical understanding
into a new theory of the Supremacy Clause that is driven by republican
federalism. The Clause must be recognized to be inherently process-
oriented1 5 rather than substantive. The Clause is foremost a federal
rule of decision for federal claims, a thread that the Court has occa-
sionally acknowledged to be a portion of the Clause's role. As such, it
supports of its own accord no substantive claims; those currently
tethered to the Clause must be reconceptualized under substantive con-
stitutional provisions or structural principles, such as federalism, or
abandoned as issues of constitutional dimension. As a rule of decision,
15. Arguing that one portion of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, is process-oricnted
does not require the adoption of the comprehensive process-based constitutional theories formu-
lated in, for example, JESSE H. CHOPER. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
cEss (1980) and JOHN H. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). See also Herbert Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalisn The Role of the States In the Composition & Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L REv. 543 (1954). For a critical review of these theo-
ries, see, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu-
tional Theories, 89 YALE LJ. 1063 (1980). Professor Frank Michelman has described republican-
ism as a process-based constitutional theory but differentiates it from the genre typified by
Wechsler and Choper. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 1525-26.
1992]
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the Clause enforces all valid federal law without adding the substantive
value of nationalism' 6 as a tacit, unqualified good.
This Article focuses its argument at the level of macro-constitu-
tional doctrine. While the level of analysis may at times seem quite
abstract, the underlying concerns are practical and concrete. Although
we type our nation a democratic republic, precious few citizens actually
participate in choosing and shaping our governmental policies. 17 We
must appreciate that if we continue to accept lax legal standards under
which the survival of state and local law is determined, we are eroding
the possibilities for meaningful self-government and retarding the op-
portunities for creative public policy resolution at the state and local
levels.' 8
The Supremacy Clause, as presently construed, plays a pivotal role
in this drama. In order to design a stable system of self-government
that citizens would ratify, the Framers were motivated to fashion a fed-
eral government of divided and concurrent powers rather than a cen-
tralized national government. Yet the states and localities are increas-
ingly becoming mere instruments of national policy and are losing the
qualities of government. Adoption of the theoretical reformations of
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence discussed here will not make a clean
sweep of the practical legal quandaries precipitated by multiple legal
sovereigns.' But the theoretical restructuring is a necessary predicate
to those tasks.
The Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence constitutes a pri-
mary means by which federalism, as a constitutional structure, value,
and practice, has been debased. The direction of constitutional deci-
sion-making toward ever greater nationalization of power cannot be
16. As used in this Article, the term "nationalism" denotes a bias in favor of locating primary
political and regulatory power at a central national level as opposed to favoring decentralization
and devolution of that power. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law,
74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988) (contrasting nationalist and federalist models of federal court
authority).
17. Benjamin Barber has incisively summarized the current democratic theory and practice to
be "politics as zoo keeping." BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLIT-
ICS FOR A NEW AGE 25 (1984).
18. This position does not entail embracing the substantive positions taken within state and
local laws as the normatively best choices. Instead it recognizes that a multiplicity of decision-
making units will yield a multiplicity of policy positions, some of which will assist in resolving
public problems more effectively than does a unitary national policy.
19. In an earlier article that elaborated both the political costs of preempting state law and a
proposed doctrinal reformation of federal preemption standards, I attempted to resolve some of
these more practical questions. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republi-
can Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1991).
[Vol. 24:829
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corrected without reforming the Clause's legal import. This long-over-
due legal project must be completed if a lively federalism 20 and, in par-
ticular, broad citizen participation in governmental affairs are to be se-
cured and protected.
I. PERSISTENT PROBLEMS IN SUPREMACY CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Marshall Legacy
The veneration Chief Justice John Marshall enjoys can be traced
primarily to two foundational contributions to our nation's institutional
structure.2 1 First, under Marshall's leadership, the Court established
itself as a co-equal branch of the federal government, rather than as a
mere subordinate of the legislative and executive branches.22 Second,
20. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, I I I S. Ct. 2395 (1991), Justice O'Connor summarized the ends
and values of federalism:
Th[e] federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advan-
tages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in demo-
cratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it
makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry....
Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate Branches of the Federal
Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one Branch, a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.
Id. at 2399-2400 (citations omitted).
21. Marshall has not, of course, received universal acclaim for his accomplishments. For in-
stance, see the newspaper essays authored by Spencer Roane, Chief Justice of the Virginia Su-
preme Court, responding to McCulloch as well as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and Cohens v. Yir-
ginia, gathered in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v, MARYLAND 106-54 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE]. Thomas Jefferson, in retirement at
Monticello, condemned McCulloch and the Marshall Court in general. See P_ KENT NE vMYEt.
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 160-61 (1985); CALEB PERRY PATrERSON. THE CO.;srI-
TUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 70, 77 (1953) (Jefferson criticized Marshall's ex-
pansive jurisprudential method, evidenced in McCulloch, and also his nationalistic bias; he viewed
Marshall and the Court as abusing the power of judicial review); see also R. Kent Newmyer.
John Marshall and the Southern Constitutional Tradition, in AN UNCERTAIN TRArntoN CON-
STITUTIONAUSM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 105, 108-20 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely.
Jr. eds., 1989) (McCulloch's elaboration and vindication of extensive implied national powers
assaulted Southern sensibilities about the relationship between nation and states, and also
threatened Southern economic interests because the northern and midwestern states held a major-
ity of congressional votes and could pass protectionist legislation that injured Southern interests).
One of Marshall's contributions not mentioned in the text is his methodological approach,
which would currently be classified as noninterpretivism. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L REv. 703 (1975).
22. This elevation in status was achieved most notably by Marbury v. Madison. 5 US. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803), where the Court ruled that it was empowered to review congressional acts
1992]
HeinOnline  -- 24 Conn. L. Rev. 835 1991-1992
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
and more important for this inquiry, the Marshall Court systematically
established the national government as the political and legal superior
to the state governments.3 This latter achievement was realized princi-
pally by Marshall's expansive interpretation of the Supremacy Clause24
in McCulloch v. Maryland,25 and by the standard for federal preemp-
tion of state law he enunciated in Gibbons v. Ogden.2 6
It is neither bold nor controversial to describe Marshall as a na-
tionalist and cite the McCulloch opinion as conclusive evidence. But in
our laudable enthusiasm for federal initiatives marching under the ban-
ner of the New Deal and broader civil rights, where McCulloch has
been repeatedly cited,2 7 we seem to have lost sight of the methodologi-
for constitutional sufficiency, id. at 177-80, and could compel the executive, here the Secretary of
State, to conform to law via mandamus, id. at 162-73. Both rulings bear continuing importance
for separation of powers principles. One of the most sophisticated critical reviews of Marbury and
the methodological jurisprudence of its author can be found in DAVID P. CURRIE. THE CONSTITU-
TION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS. 1789-1888, at 66-74 (1985).
23. The celebrated cases by which this latter achievement was realized include: McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that a federal instrumentality is not subject to
regulation or taxation by a state); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)
(ruling that the Supreme Court possessed the power and responsibility to review state court deci-
sions that denied federal rights to a private party); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821) (holding that the Martin principle applies to require compliance with federal law, even
where a state is the defendant); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (ruling that a
federal act regulating commerce ousts inconsistent state law and licenses granted thereunder);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (holding state officers can be
held accountable for violations of federal law in federal courts). For a profound study of the
federal commerce power elaborated in several of these cases, see FELIX FRANKFURTER. THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY. & WAITE (1937).
24. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403-06; Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 215-
22. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
26. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
27. The Supreme Court invoked McCulloch v. Maryland to support a range of landmark
decisions regarding the New Deal. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944)
(ruling Congress is not confined to the smallest possible delegation of discretion to administrative
officers); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (Congress' power to regulate com-
merce not confined to regulation of interstate commerce); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 326 (1936) (forbidding Congress from using the Commerce Clause as a pretext to
enact law not properly within the scope of power granted to the federal government). Its use of
McCulloch in major civil rights cases includes Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443
(1968) (citing McCulloch's proposition that if the end is legitimate, any means necessary are
appropriate); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (same); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
[Vol. 24:829
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cal and normative predicate driving McCulloch's ringing pronounce-
ments. The objective of my discussion of McCulloch is limited to trac-
ing that predicate-Marshall's creation of a supra-constitutional value
through which the Constitution's text is refracted to yield both its ulti-
mate and applied meaning.28
The McCulloch facts are well known. The second Bank of the
United States aroused strong opposition in the states, where the Bank
competed for business with local concerns. 29 Newspaper reports that
Bank officers had committed fraud and embezzlement exacerbated an
already volatile situation. The Maryland legislature chose to respond
by imposing a tax on any corporation not chartered by the state. The
only corporation that fit this description was the Bank. 30 When the
Bank refused to pay the tax, process was issued against a Bank officer
who had been exposed as a speculator and an embezzler.31 The Mary-
land Court of Appeals upheld the state's power to collect the tax.
The parties presented two questions to the Supreme Court: first,
did Congress possess the power to incorporate the Bank, given that this
power was not specifically enumerated in Article I; and, second, assum-
ing creation of the Bank was a proper exercise of Congress' power, was
it susceptible to the Maryland tax. Marshall elaborated the Supremacy
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (ruling that the power of Congress extends be-
yond the regulation of interstate commerce). Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938) (articulating a rational relation test for equal protection cases but acknowl-
edging exceptions to that approach for certain types of issues, and also citing McCulloch).
28. To some readers this discussion will seem unfair to the Chief Justice, for it does not elabo-
rate the lasting contributions to both social and legal history that arc traceable to McCulloch.
Others have discussed the opinion in far greater detail and with a broader range of analytic facets
than I will here. See. e.g., CURRIE, supra note 22, at 66-74; GEOF'REY R STONE T AL CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 54-71 (2d ed. 1991); GERALD GUNTHEg. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72-94 (1 Ith ed.
1985). It is not that I reject the use of prisms, or special lenses, when interpreting the Constitution
in favor of employing a purportedly "objective" or a purely textualist approach. See infra note 47
and accompanying text. But in seeking to revive a republican federalism in constitutional law, we
must understand and renounce any further use of Marshall's prism of national supremacy that
operates as an independent, superintending constitutional value.
29. The second Bank had been chartered and operated under administrations headed by the
earlier Bank's opponents, the Jeffersonian Republicans. Thus, while their support for the Bank
contradicted their general precepts of strictly construing the powers the Constitution granted to
the national government, the second Bank encountered no significant ideological opposition at the
national level. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 21, at 3-7.
30. This recognition suggests that had the legal test been formulated to proscribe discrimina-
tory treatment of federal instrumentalities, the opinion would have been narrower and more defen-
sible. Exploration of alternative theories for sustaining Congress' power to create the Bank and its
immunity from state tax are not germane to my broader project here.
31. See G. EDWARD WHITE. THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE. 1813-35. at 543
(1988).
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Clause's import in answering both questions, mentioning "supremacy"
or "supreme" no fewer than twenty-four times, 2 and quoting portions
of the Clause at least five times.33 Even though the Court's resolution
of each question could have been explained without reference to the
Clause, Marshall chose to circle back to it repeatedly.
Marshall tipped his hand early in his discussion of whether Con-
gress was constitutionally empowered to incorporate the Bank. That
question raised other questions by inference, 4 most of which Marshall
sought to answer in synthesizing a coherent framework of national
power. He noted that "the conflicting powers of the general and State
governments must be brought into view, and the supremacy of their
respective laws, when they are in opposition, must be settled."3 His
decision to describe the powers of the two governments as "conflicting"
is suggestive of necessary a priori knowledge about the inherent interre-
lation of state and nation. This position not only tends to prejudge the
result in the case, but also anticipates the mode of analysis adopted.
Mere difference in powers need not result in Marshall's chosen term,
that of "conflict," which connotes opposition and even hostility.36 This
assumption that the powers themselves were inherently in conflict fore-
closed a more limited inquiry into the actual effects of state regulation
on the federal entity, and whether the state's exercise of its powers
32. E.g., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402, 405 (1819).
33. See, e.g., id. at 405, 432.
34. See id. at 399-416 (discussing whether the Constitution proceeded from the people or from
"sovereign and independent states"; deciding whether powers not expressly enumerated fall within
the constitutional grant of congressional power).
35. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
36. Marshall uses precisely these terms. See id. at 400-01 (the question before the Court must
be decided "or [there will] remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility of a still
more serious nature"); id. at 405, 436 (opposition). See also id. at 419 (Maryland's approach
would "almost annihilate" Congress' ability to select its means). Marshall went on to say that
"[the] great principle is that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof arc su-
preme; that they control the constitution and laws of the ... States and cannot be controlled by
them.'"Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
While one feature of supremacy discernible from the Clause is the ability of federal law to
trump or displace state law, in fashioning this "axiom," Marshall again revealed his view of
supremacy as a zero-sum game between two inherently hostile powers. This becomes clearer in the
"corollaries" to the axiom:
Ist. That a power to create implies a power to preserve.
2d. That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible
with these powers to create and preserve.
3d. That where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not
yield to that over which it is supreme.
Id. at 426.
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was, in this instance, proscribed.
Exhibiting the rationalism of his time, Marshall turned first to
reason and only second to the constitutional text for support. That the
Union was "supreme within its sphere of action"37 would seem to "re-
sult necessarily from its nature. '  Here we discover another rhetorical
and methodological presupposition Marshall pervasively employs: a su-
preme government has an essence that can be clearly defined.30 Textual
limits, and even implied structural principles such as federalism, need
not be consulted. Rather, Marshall delineates the properties and char-
acteristics that must belong to a supreme government as though they
are immutable, universal, and knowable through the powers of reason.
While Marshall does not explicitly remark that the Framers must have
meant precisely the properties he selects to be the defining essence of a
supreme national government, he intimates that as rational beings they,
like he, knew the essence of national supremacy.40
These strains are intoned more vigorously and explicitly in resolv-
ing the second question presented, Maryland's power to tax the Bank.
To generate the constitutional limits on state taxation, Marshall in-
voked as his prime scripture the Supremacy Clause's recognition of
federal law as the "supreme" law. 1 He fashioned the concept of a "su-
preme government" whose essence he was charged to distill: 42
37. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
38. Id.
39. 1 am indebted to Tom Ross for his penetrating studies of rhetorical structures in the
Court's contemporary jurisprudence. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty. Their Immoral-
ity. Our Helplessness. 79 GEO. LJ. 1499 (1991); Thomas Ross. The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race:
White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L REV I (1990). My purpose is
analogous to Ross'; his is to "shake this comfortable sense of assurance about our historical stand-
ing and thus encourage us to rethink our choices about race." Id. at 1. Mine is to rethink the same
types of deeply embedded choices about the contours of national supremacy.
40. See McCulloch. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405-07. The unstated jurisprudential premise that
law forms a portion of universal reason is only foreshadowed in McCulloch; its fullest expression
would await Justice Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I. 18-19 (1842).
41. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426. In developing his argument here, Marshall explic-
itly conceded that the Constitution conferred the taxation power on both the nation and the states
concurrently. Id. at 425. But he noted that Article I also imposed specific limitations on certain
types of state taxation, which he construed to "concede[ ]," Id.. that state taxation is subordinate
to and is thus "controlled by the constitution." Id. at 427. Interestingly. then, instead of finding
Article l's rather precise textual provision to authorize only the express limitations on state taxa-
tion, Marshall transformed the Constitution's identification of some narrow textual proscriptions
into a more general principle: because state taxation was subject to constitutional limits, and inter-
pretation of the Constitution was avowedly a responsibility of the Court, the Court could infer and
apply other constitutional limits on state taxation.
42. Id. at 427 passim.
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It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles
to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every
power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own
operation from their own influence. This effect need not be
stated in terms. It is ... so necessarily implied in it, that the
expression of it could not make it more certain. We must,
therefore, keep it in view while construing the constitution.
43
The charge, "to remove all obstacles to its action within its own
sphere," contains prescriptive and not merely descriptive aspect; it has
embedded within it a particular project for the national government.44
The image on the vista is of an impervious, nonnegotiating, and utterly
separate hegemony. To protect its supremacy the national government
must be allowed "to modify every power vested in subordinate govern-
ments, [so] as to exempt its own operation from their own influence."45
No infection of democratic republicanism operating at the state levels
would affect the emerging national sovereignty.
In McCulloch, Marshall did not restrict his normative prescrip-
tions of the essential meaning of national governmental supremacy to a
certain set of legal issues. Rather, in a portion of the opinion elaborat-
ing the essence of a supreme government, he states "[w]e must ...
keep [the requirements of national supremacy] in view while construing
the constitution. ' 0 Whether read independently or in conjunction with
the entire opinion, Marshall's comment reveals his creation of national
supremacy as a supra-constitutional value, the prism through which the
balance of the Constitution, including structural federalism principles
and any asserted limits on federal power, would be refracted. 47 So piv-
43. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427 (emphasis added). Note that Marshall's use of
"necessar[y]" accords quite well with the meaning Maryland urged in the construction of the
"necessary and proper" clause. See id. at 412-15.
44. Indeed, before the Court decided McCulloch, the nationalists in Congress had become
dispirited and had ceased most attempts to enlarge and fortify the scope of federal activities. They
viewed McCulloch to delineate a nationalistic vision and to provide direct encouragement for en-
hancing national power. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 21, at 6.
45. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427 (emphasis added). By contrast, in dicta in Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 206 (1824), Marshall's tone became much more conciliatory. In
discussing the states' exercise of their police powers, Marshall anticipated that some state laws
might "interfere with and be affected by" Congress' laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
"Congress, in that spirit of harmony and conciliation, which ought always to characterize the
conduct of governments standing in the relation which that of the Union and those of the states
bear to each other," assisted in the enforcement of some state laws and "adapted its own legisla-
tion" to help achieve the states' goals. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 206.
46. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427.
47. Marshall was no democrat and his contempt for Jeffersonian republicanism is well-docu-
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otal is the supremacy aspect and project of the Constitution that in
construing the Constitution, "no principle not declared, can be ad-
missable [sic] which would defeat the legitimate operations of a su-
preme government. 48
Marshall was much more muted rhetorically in Gibbons v.
Ogden,49 but nevertheless built upon the foundation laid in McCulloch.
In Gibbons, the contours of the Commerce Clause power were at issue,
and in particular, the preemptive effect of a federal law on a state-
granted steamboat license. In McCulloch, Marshall had announced the
broad principle that "States have no power ... to retard, impede, bur-
den, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by Congress .... -50 In Gibbons, his gloss on the Supremacy
Clause's directive to set aside "contrary" state laws was condensed in
the ruling that state laws that "interfer[e] with, [or are] contrary to"
federal law must be displaced by federal law."1 The gloss neatly
summed up McCulloch's broad inventory of prohibited state law effects
on federal law. Yet Marshall failed to justify his standard in terms of
the Clause's narrow specificity as to the type of interference that would
require displacement, that of being "contrary" to the federal law.
The Supreme Court continues to invoke both the rhetoric of
mented. See. e.g., LEONARD BAKER. JOHN MARSHALL A LIFE IN LAw 195-96, 207-08. 283-84
(1974). Marshall's methodological prism for enhancement of national power ought to be perceived
as dangerous to the people and not simply to the states qua states; the prism was not limited to
nation-versus-state conflicts, but could just as easily be deployed in the battles or nation versus
individual. Marshall at one point attempted to justify his holding by maintaining that he was
striking down a law promulgated by only a portion of the people that attempted to modify a law
that all of the people had wrought. See McCulloch, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) at 410. Yet his invocation
of "the people" functions as a rhetorical abstraction only. Marshall focused on protecting the
power of the national government, not that of the people themselves.
48. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427 (emphasis added). In this one stroke., Marshall reverses the
principle Maryland sought. Instead of requiring the national government to justify any exercise of
authority under the enumerated powers or under a narrow reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Marshall mandates that any purported limitations on national power be expressly stated.
By this move the precept that the national sovereignty was vested with limited powers and the
states retained the balance was transformed into a presumption of unlimited national power vis.-
.vis the states (and individuals), absent affirmative disabilities placed upon it. The "defeat" of
governmental operations might be construed to be a strict criterion, but in light of Marshall's
subsequent broad standard that states have no power to "retard, impede., burden, or in any man-
ner control" national governmental operations, id. at 436, it is better interpreted to connote any
state intrusion as a zero-sum game. Further, given Marshall's casual handling of the text as
though it is merely an occasion for theorizing, his call for a clear statement of any principles
negating or undermining the supreme government appears disingenuous.
49. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
51. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210.
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McCulloch and the Gibbons preemption standard.52 Bernard Schwartz
has argued that Marshall's enduring legacy here may be summarized
in two postulates:53 "the States may not interfere in any manner with
the functioning of the Federal Government, ' 54 and "federal action
(whether in the form of a statute, treaty, court decision, or administra-
tive act), if itself constitutional, must prevail over state action inconsis-
tent therewith.1
5 5
Despite the Court's frequent indulgence of these principles as
though they embody and exhaust the Supremacy Clause's meaning,"0
they do not withstand scrutiny. However comfortable the legal commu-
nity has become with these representations of the Clause's "essential" 5
meaning, they do not have unequivocal doctrinal support as formu-
lated. 58 For instance, states may "interfere" with federal government
instrumentalities in certain circumstances,5" and simply because a state
statute or policy differs from, or technically is "inconsistent" with, a
federal statute does not mean the state statute must be struck down.60
52. Cases that invoke McCulloch include North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434,
438 (1990); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)
(the dissent opined that the states may not "retard, impede, [or] burden" federal law); Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976). These cases demonstrate McCulloch's continuing rhetorical im-
port for discerning the boundaries of federal and state regulatory power, regarding both the types
of claims recognized and the standards for evaluating the permissibility of state regulation. Cases
that invoke Gibbons' preemption standard that proscribes state laws that "interfere with, or are
contrary" to federal law include Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, IIl S. Ct. 2476, 2481
(1991); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985); Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981).
53. Schwartz's adulatory introductory passage is instructive: "In terms so clear that they have
never been questioned, the great Chief Justice construed the Supremacy Clause as the bulwark of
national power it has since remained." I BERNARD SCHWARTZ. A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 38 (1963).
54. Id. (emphasis added) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
55. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
56. See e.g., Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943) (discussing intergovernmental
immunities postulate); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315 (1964).
57. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 39.
58. Moreover, neither the text of the Clause nor the history of the founding necessarily sup-
port these views, as the balance of this Article will demonstrate.
59. See. e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that Ohio work-
ers' compensation law applied to federal instrumentality).
60. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, Ill S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (ruling that a
federal statute did not preempt a municipality's sign-posting and permit requirements); English v.
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) (declining to preempt employee's state law tort claim for
alleged inconsistency with federal whistleblower statute); California v. ARC America, 490 U.S.
93 (1989) (ruling that a federal statute's delineation of rights, remedies, and policies constitutes
the federal decision on those questions and does not by implication prevent the states from decid-
ing the questions differently).
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Moreover, because of the positivistic form in which they are now
presented, the supposed postulates fail to recognize and accommodate
the federalist compromises that undergird our Constitution. As framed,
they are not faithful to the constitutional plan of divided and shared
powers,61 and tend to fortify the seemingly inherent press for centrali-
zation of regulatory power in the national government.
B. Limitations of a Purely Textualist Interpretation
The purported Supremacy Clause axioms are not only misleading
presentations of law, but their habitual invocation obscures the complex
interpretive task required by the Supremacy Clause and conceals the
analytic morass pervading decisions in which the Clause is invoked.
1. Textual Gleanings
Some provisions of the Constitution are more precisely formulated
than others. The bar to state coinage of money, 2 and the mandate that
the presidential election occur on the same date throughout the na-
tion,63 for example, apparently produce little confusion and tend to sug-
gest that at least for these clauses a purely textualist approach is suffi-
cient to ascertain the Constitution's meaning.64 In some invocations,
the Court has handled the Supremacy Clause as though it, too, has a
self-evident and unproblematic meaning.6 5 Yet, as to whether the
61. The legal literature reassessing American federalism from a variety of ideological stances
has grown markedly during the last decade. Important contributions include ADVISORY COwIN
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. REGULATORY FEDERALISM POLICY. PROCESS. IMPACT AND
REFORM (1984); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism. 96 YALE LJ 1425 (1987);
Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered. In CO.IPARATIVE Cos-
STITUTIONAL LAw 77 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Pro-
cess, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 663 (1980); Richard B. Stewart. Federalism & Rights. 19 GA L
REV. 917 (1985); Mark Tushnet, Federalism & the Traditions of American Political Theory. 19
GA. L. REV. 981 (1985); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER. FEDERAUS't TatE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
(1987)).
62. US. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
63. US. CONsT. art. 11, § 1, cl. 4.
64. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL L REV 399 (1985); see PIuP
BOBBITT. CONSTITUTIONAL FATE. THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 25-38 (1982) (delineating textu-
alism as a specific mode of constitutional analysis); William N. Eskridge. Jr., The New, Textual-
ism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (highlighting the flaws in contemporary textualism). But see
Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-aged President. 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 250 (1989) and Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL L REv
1152, 1174 (1985) (even the seemingly precise constitutional requirement that the President have
attained the age of 35 is susceptible to a multitude of interpretations).
65. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 US. 33, 56-57 (1990).
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Clause contemplates federal judicial review of congressional legislation
to determine its constitutionality, a strictly textualist accounting will
strive in vain. 6 Even apart from questions regarding federal judicial
review, 67 the Clause's import for the interplay of state and federal law
is as problematic as the more celebrated open-textured provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses. 8 Moreover, errant interpretations of the
Clause injures the polity in ways that are neither trivial nor infrequent.
Rather, the effects generated are pernicious to the constitutional struc-
ture and to a genuinely republican polity. 9
The Supremacy Clause is located in the second clause of Article
VI.7 0 While the balance of the Constitution allocates certain powers to
the nation and others to the states, and forbids certain types of activity,
it does not explicitly articulate a normative hierarchy as part of the
federalist system until Article VI.71 Exclusive of Article VI, one plausi-
ble reading of the document is that the state and national governments
are charged with fulfilling disparate functions and responsibilities, and
may exercise some powers concurrently, but that neither government is
66. Leading constitutional theorists have also failed to produce a conclusive explanation for
judicial review, resulting in disagreements, for instance, between Charles Black and Alexander
Bickel. Compare CHARLES L. BLACK. JR.. STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 72-76 (1965) with ALEXANDER M. BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH THE SUPREIE
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 12-14 (1962).
67. See infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text for a brief discussion or federal judicial
review as a principle inferable from the interaction of Articles III and VI.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69. The legal literature seeking to delineate and advocate a renewed republicanism originated
with the work of leading constitutional law scholars. See Brest, supra note Ii; Michelman, supra
note II; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). See also
Abrams, supra note II (arguing a renewed republicanism requires reconsideration and enhance-
ment of local governments); Hoke, supra note 19, at 710-14 (arguing that republican federalism
requires radical decentralization of regulatory power and empowerment of average citizens).
70. Article VI's other two clauses are concerned with declaring the continued validity of debts
incurred by the national government under the Articles of Confederation as against the national
government after ratification (art. VI, cl. I), and requiring all officers of the national and state
governments, including the judiciaries, to make an oath or affirmation "to support this Constitu-
tion" (art. VI, cl. 3). The first clause obviously does not impair any notion of co-equal, shared
government, but the third clause's asymmetry implies the hierarchical relation; national officers
are not required to take an oath of office to support the state governments, even if only to the
degree that these governments act consistently with the national Constitution.
71. This is true except for the explicit sovereignty of the people over the entire structure per
the Preamble's "We, the People. . ." phrasing, and their direct and diffused structural control over
the governmental system. Although Congress may be deemed normatively superior to the other
branches of the national government, the point is not germane to the federal relation.
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normatively "better" or more powerful than the other.7 2  The
Supremacy Clause, however, fundamentally changes any such percep-
tion, 3 which is one reason the antifederalists vehemently attacked the
Constitution during the ratification process.74
The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.7 5
The Clause thus creates a favored class of law, that which is denomi-
nated "supreme Law." By its terms, the only government that has the
opportunity to convert its legal norms into "supreme Law" is the na-
tional government, 6 and the Clause mandates that the judges "in every
State" are bound by this national law. To guard against any miscon-
ceptions as to the meaning of "supreme Law," the paragraph details
that state law "Contrary" to the Constitution shall not stand.77 The one
threshold that national law must traverse on the way to obtaining the
brass ring of supremacy is that the law78 in question must be "in Pur-
suance" of, or consistent with, the Constitution."
According to this unvarnished interpretation of the text, the
Supremacy Clause mandates that courts must apply federal law80 as
72. As feminist theorists have demonstrated, difference need not connote superiority. See
MARTHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION. EXCLUSION & AMERICAN LAW 50
(1990).
73. See CURRIE, supra note 22, at 167 (observing "the supremacy clause is a one-way
street"); ScHWARTZ supra note 53, at 39 (noting the Supremacy Clause prevents equality be-
ti'een the states and the federal government because "federal and state powers do not stand upon
equal elevation").
74. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
75. US. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
76. One might refer to it as a "federal" government. Cf. Fallon, supra note 16. at 1246.
77. Arguably, then, the Supremacy Clause explicitly authorizes judicial review of state law for
its fidelity to the national Constitution. It does not specify which system of courts--state or na-
tional-is to have this responsibility or final authority over such questions. Nor do= the Clause
expressly authorize federal judicial review of federal statutes for their constitutionality. See US
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
78. For the moment, I am bypassing treaties, which are a special and rare case of federal
lawmaking. See infra note 99.
79. See RAOUL BERGER. FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 98-99 (1987).
80. Treaty provisions must also be applied. See US CoNsT art. VI, cl. 2. Arguably, federal
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the governing rules of decision for federal questions. As the Supreme
Court recently reminded the states in Howlett v. Rose,"' if a party de-
nies that a mandatory federal decisional rule must be applied and en-
forced in adjudicating a federal claim, and covertly disputes the ulti-
mate authority and compulsion of otherwise constitutional federal
rules, then the Supremacy Clause is properly invoked to enlighten the
parties, or the lower court, as the case may be.82 In Howlett, a Florida
appeals court had ruled that the state's sovereign immunity, a creature
of state statutory law, could properly be interposed as a defense,
thereby defeating the plaintiff's federal civil rights claim. 3 Although
the United States Supreme Court had previously ruled on that specific
issue, 4 the Florida court held that it was bound by its state decisional
law, not federal law.8 5 The unanimous Howlett opinion directly refuted
the state court's supposed primary allegiance to state law to the dero-
gation of federal law, repeatedly citing the Supremacy Clause as the
source of the governing principles.86 Rarely does a court need to cite
common law, administrative rules, and executive orders should also be acknowledged as federal
rules of decision entitled to supremacy status. These types of federal "law" are more problematic
than commonly recognized in light of, inter alia, the Supremacy Clause's text. See infra text
accompanying notes 91-99.
81. 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 277 (1980):
Mondov v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1943); Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
82. 110 S. Ct. 2430 passim.
83. See Howlett v. Rose, 537 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
84. On whether a state law sovereign immunity defense could be applied to § 1983 actions, the
Court admonished:
A construction of a federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have
controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be en-
forced .... The immunity defense claim raises a question of federal law.
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980) (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d
602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973)).
85. In dicta, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Florida precedent that the state's inter-
mediate appeals court purported to apply (viz. Hill v. Dep't of Corrections, 513 So. 2d 129 (Fla.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988)) was itself consistent with the Court's Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence. See Howlett, I10 S. Ct. 2430, 2436-37 (1990). The Florida appeals decision
in Howlett, however, extended the principles beyond the permissible boundaries. Id. at 2437.
86. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. 2430 passim. The Howlett opinion, despite being unanimous (or per-
haps because it was unanimous, see Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordi-
nating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 231, 247), reads as though it were a law
clerk's bench memorandum hastily revised for issuance as the Court opinion. Instead of narrowly
confining itself to Martinez-the Court's direct authority on the issue-the opinion purports to
elaborate all of the Supremacy Clause jurisprudence in one neatly coherent whole and seeks to
refute, in particular, arguments raised by an amicus (the Washington Legal Foundation; the
Court names the foundation and answers its arguments five times in the opinion) that were not
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the Clause explicitly as its authority for applying federal law as the
governing rule of decision for federal questions, and appropriately so:
the Clause functions as a meta-constitutional provision whose primary
role is at once pervasive and normally invisible.
It would be a mistake, however, to presume that the text of the
Supremacy Clause could be understood and applied this straightfor-
wardly. More subtle analysis of the Clause reveals the limitations of a
purely textualist account; the Clause's text does not provide unequivo-
cal support for some of the conclusions that function almost axiomati-
cally in our law. Invocation of the Clause may well mask a number of
constitutional interrelationships that are not only complex but contro-
versial. For instance, the Court often refers to Congress' "power under
the Supremacy Clause ... to preempt state law,"'87 or to divest state
courts of their "presumptively concurrent jurisdiction."8 18 Yet Congress'
constitutional powers are conferred by Article I, not by the Supremacy
Clause.89 This shorthand actually conceals several contestable legal in-
ferences9" and continues to impede recognition of the larger theoretical
pressed by any party. See 110 S. Ct. 2430 passim. In so doing, the two objectives of the decision
are undermined: resolution of the case before the Court seems almost an afterthought, and the
attempt to articulate Supremacy Clause principles is distorted.
87. See. e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n. 489 U.S. 493. 509
(1989); see also Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 271 (1985) ("The
attempt of the South Dakota legislation to limit the manner in which counties spend federal (dol-
lars] obstructs this congressional purpose and runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause.").
88. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821-23 (1990) (unanimous);
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
89. See US. CONsT. art I, § I: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... "
90. For example, when the Court refers to Congress' "power under the Supremacy Clause...
to preempt state law," the phrasing suggests that Congress' powers to preempt are plenary. and
not properly subject to limits imposed by the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, or by the Guarantee
Clause, all of which are contestable propositions. For a discussion of Tenth Amendment limita-
tions on the power of Congress to regulate the states and supersede state law, compare the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
For a pathbreaking discussion of the Guarantee Clause, see Deborah J. Merritt. The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM L REV I (1988).
Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of state courts over all federal claims is also con-
testable. For instance, Congress has no power to eliminate state court jurisdiction of federal con-
stitutional claims. Henry Harts justly renown Dialogue demonstrated that Congress can validly
limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts but cannot constrain state courts from hearing
and vindicating a federal constitutional right. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv L REV 1362
(1953). See also Bator, supra note 7, at 627-29 (arguing for renewed attention to and enhance-
ment of the role of state courts in adjudicating federal constitutional rights, to promote inter alia
greater protection against tyrannical national government). These questions must also be resolved
by inferences drawn from the interaction of Article I, Article Ill (because it concerns the constitu-
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inconsistencies.
An additional example of textual ambiguity can be found in the
language providing that the "Laws of the United States" are supreme
over the state law. What federal actions should we understand to be the
"laws" thus granted supremacy? Arguably, the Clause incorporates by
reference only congressional acts owing to Article I's vesting of "[a]ll
legislative powers" in that body. 1 Yet, more generally, the post-New
Deal Court recognizes lawmaking power in a variety of sources other
than Congress: federal agencies, which issue administrative law pursu-
ant to the Administrative Procedure Act 2 and the particular enabling
statutes; the President, who promulgates Executive Orders93 and execu-
tive agreements;94 and the federal judiciary,9 5 which pronounces federal
tional scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction), and structural federalism principles,
rather than the Supremacy Clause per se.
91. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 1. This view would also accord with the Constitutional Convention's
resolution that formed the basis of the Supremacy Clause, prior to its stylistic changes. See Infra
note 169 and accompanying text. But the restrictive interpretive approach would fail to encompass
common law principles, which formed a significant portion of the governing law of the period and
were arguably denoted by the term "Laws of the United States."
92. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1988). The Court confers supremacy status on administrative rules,
including preemptive administrative rules. See, e.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock
Co., 480 U.S. 572, 582-86 (1987); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-700
(1984).
93. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1967), which forbids employment discrimination by federal contractors and provides an
administrative remedy that may include barring the contractor from present and future grants,
has been credited as being more successful than Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17, at provid-
ing equal employment opportunities for minorities and women. See generally BARBARA SCILEI &
PAUL GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 347-55 (2d ed. Supp. 1989). Because it
reaches to subcontractors and sub-subcontractors (i.e., to those who have a subcontract with the
government to provide goods or services worth $2500 or more), the Order has affected the hiring
and promotion practices of thousands of businesses. Id. at 356-59.
94. The Court illuminates the President's power to enter into binding executive agreements
with foreign countries in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 passim (1981). There the
Court upheld the constitutional validity of the executive agreement with Iran to obtain the release
of American hostages. This agreement required "nullification" of prejudgment attachments of
Iranian assets and "suspension" of any and all American judicial proceedings concerning claims
against Iran pending their transfer to a binding arbitration panel. Professor Jules Lobel deplored
this decision, for it "undermined the thrust of [Congress'] reform effort," which was designed to
reign in and provide democratic supervision of the President's emergency powers in foreign affairs.
See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1412-18
(1989). For generally more positive reviews of the decision, see Symposium: Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 29 UCLA L. REv. 977 (1982). Dames & Moore v. Regan can be viewed as constricting
the principles stated in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (despite their lacking
Senate ratification, for Supremacy Clause purposes, international compacts and agreements have
a "similar dignity" to treaties).
95. While I have referred in the text only to federal courts' lawmaking powers under federal
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common law of both the constitutional 6 and nonconstitutional genre.9
It is not self-evident textually from the Supremacy Clause or other con-
stitutional provisions that the rules that issue from these three sources
other than Congress9 should be encompassed by the term "Laws of the
United States" and entitled to supremacy status.09
law, it is important to recall that state courts also possess the power and the responsibility to rule
on federal claims. See Bator, supra note 7, at 623-37; BICKEL, supra note 66, at 9-13.
96. The classic article on the topic is Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court. 1974
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV, L REV I (1975). But see Thomas S.
Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv L REV
1117 (1978) (arguing that Monaghan overlooks meaningful differences between constitutional in-
terpretation and common law adjudication).
97. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 US. 500 (1988), provides a recent example of
the vitality, if not the excessive indulgence, of the Court's common law powers. There the Court
fashioned a novel common law rule to protect federal defense contractors from state product lia-
bility suits brought by military personnel (or their survivors) who were injured by the product.
The Court concluded that even though explicit federal legislation did not exist to protect federal
contractors, state tort law could be preempted in order to immunize the contractors and protect
the federal government's interests, which were putatively impaired by the tort suits. Id. at 506-13.
98. Administrative agencies are the delegatees of Congress, and some supposed limits con-
strain the range of discretionary authority they may exercise, per the nondelegation doctrine. See
American Textile Mfg. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Industrial Union Dep't. AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Field v. Clark. 143 U.S.
649 (1892). For a discussion of the doctrine and its problems, see Richard B. Stewart, Beyond the
Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 323 (1987). The literature on executive orders remains
slim. One study, Joel L. Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufes, Law and Order: The Problem of Presi-
dential Legislation, 40 LAW & CoTEMP, PROBS. I (1976), considers orders promoting civil rights
in government activities and contracts, and orders that attempt to achieve economic stablization,
and draws more general conclusions about appropriate statutory bases for their constitutional va-
lidity. See also AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied. 443 US.
915 (1979) (considering validity of order 12,092 permitting debarment of companies from govern-
ment contracts above S5 million that fail or refuse to comply with voluntary wage and price
standards); L. Harold Levinson, Presidential Self-Regulation through Rulemaking: Comparathe
Comments on Structuring the Chief Executive's Constitutional Powers, 9 VAND J TRANSNAT'L
L. 695 (1976). Martha Field delineates the federal common law power in Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L REV 883 (1986). See also the spirited exchange
between Professors Martin Redish and Louise Weinberg: Martin H. Redish, Federal Common
Law. Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process, 83 Nw U L REv 761 (1989). and
Federal Common Law and American Political Theory, id. at 853; Louise Veinb-rg, Federal
Common Law 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Federal Common Law. and
The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Suprene Federal Common Law. Id.
at 860.
99. By contrast, consider the special treatment the Clause affords to another type of nonstatu-
tory law-treaties. Treaties are expressly included as a part of "the Laws" that possess legal
supremacy. Yet controversy remains. Some scholars have argued that because the Clause qualifies
the treaty power simply as "under the Authority of the United States," rather than "in Pursu-
ance" of the Constitution, US. CoNsr. art VI, cl. 2, a treaty can override the constitutional re-
strictions on the powers of the national government. See GUNTHER, supra note 28. at 226-27
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These examples illustrate the limitations of any purely textualist
account of the Supremacy Clause's role in resolving the relationships
between state and federal law. Even more critical for our purposes,
however, are two other questions that a textualist reading of the Clause
cannot adequately resolve: when is state law "to the Contrary" of fed-
eral law, and whether the Clause itself can provide the basis for sub-
stantive legal claims.
2. When Is State Law "to the Contrary"?
The pivotal portion of the Supremacy Clause vis-A-vis the states is
its final clause. Here it states that "the Judges in every State shall be
bound [by the Supreme Law], any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." While various aspects
of this language are problematic,100 the most critical are its last four
(discussion of the battle surrounding the proposed "Bricker Amendment" to the Constitution,
which would have explicitly circumscribed the treaty power within the balance of the constitu-
tional framework). This concern was allayed only in 1957, when the Supreme Court responded
that "[t]he obvious and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free
from the restraints of the Constitution." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion).
It would seem that the constitutional aspects of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
would compel this conclusion. In practice, of course, the treaty power is rarely invoked, for Presi-
dents continue to prefer executive agreements, which, when within their constitutional parameters,
may be negotiated and concluded unilaterally. See Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General
Agreement on Tariffs & Trade in U.S. Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 493-508 (1990)
(reviewing the legal status of executive agreements). In an informal conversation with me, Profes-
sor Brand estimated that perhaps 90% of all agreements with foreign countries are pursued as
executive agreements.
100. Note first that the District of Columbia is technically not a state. For instance, it lacks
voting senators and a member of Congress, and the Twenty-third Amendment provides a mecha-
nism for the District to participate in presidential elections by voting for electors, despite its lack-
ing the constitutional status of a state. Forrest McDonald contends that the Convention inadver-
tently failed to revise the Clause's language binding judges "in every State" once it later decided
to create the District of Columbia. See FORREST MCDONALD. Novus ORDO SECLORUM: AN IN-
TELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 255-56 (1985). Once the Convention designated the
newly created District as the seat of national government, it intended to locate there the Supreme
Court as well as the legislative and executive units. Literally, then, the Supreme Court was be-
yond the command of the Supremacy Clause. Note also that the Clause explicitly binds only one
group of institutional actors-judges. Nevertheless, the Court has repeatedly referred to the obli-
gations of state and locally elected officials under the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56-57 (1990). Interestingly, former U.S. Attorney General Thornburgh
justified one of his administrative actions as compelled by the Supremacy Clause. See Jerry E.
Norton, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74 JUDICATURE 203, 205-06 (1991).
The third clause of Article VI helps to remedy these anomalous conclusions by requiring an
oath or affirmation of support for the Constitution from all state legislators and "all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl, 3. Yet,
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words: "to the Contrary notwithstanding." It might be argued that not
only this portion of the text, but the whole Clause as well is superfluous
because it merely asserts a truism that any purported law arising from
politically inferior units that is inconsistent with the larger unit's law
cannot stand.101
But the meaning of the phrase, "to the Contrary notwithstanding,"
is transparent only from the most formalistic interpretive stance. The
problematic nature of the phrase becomes most apparent in the pre-
emption context.1 0 2 The Supremacy Clause, on which preemption
claims are currently based, expressly approves the displacement of state
law when it is "to the Contrary" of an applicable federal rule. The
Court has adumbrated a variable set of reasons that sanction the dis-
placement of otherwise valid state law.10 3 The recognized reasons for
preemption have been generated and applied with little attention to ei-
ther the constitutional text that empowers the supersession of state law
is the oath requirement merely formal, or does it reassert with independent authority a substantive
responsibility incumbent upon all public officials to enforce the Constitution and valid federal law?
Under what circumstances does this affirmation come into play, and what duties does it impose?
While these are salient queries, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
Importantly, by using the preposition "in" rather than "of" or "from" in the phrase "in every
State," the Framers bound all judges (save for those in the District), whether their authority lay
within the national court system or within the states and localities. This accords well with the
prior language directing that the national law's supremacy extends to "the Land." rather than
naming a particular type of political unit (states or nation).
101. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1831-1833 (1833) ("[w]hat other inference could have been drawn, than of [its] supremacy, if
the Constitution had been totally silent?").
102. In its strict sense, the term "federal preemption" designates a legal determination that
state or local law is invalid and cannot be enforced because of inconsistency %ith some aspect of
governing federal legislative or regulatory law. See supra note 3.
103. The types of preemption the Court currently recognizes include express preemption
(where Congress states in the statutory text an intention to preempt state law) and implied pre-
emption (inferred from a particular statutory provision or the scheme taken as a %hole). The
Court recognizes two subtypes of implied preemption: (1) federal occupation of a regulatory field.
and (2) conflict with a federal law, which is composed of two sub-subtypes: (a) impossibility of
compliance with both the federal and state law, and (b) where the state law stands as an obstacle
to the full accomplishment and execution of the congressional objectives. See. e.g., Northwest
Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493. 509 (1989). For proof of the variabil-
ity of the Court's typology, compare Northwest Central with Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) (listing six distinct species of preemption) and Chicago &
N.W. Transport. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile, 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (listing three bases of
preemption).
For a highly critical review of the preemption methodology, see Hoke, supra note 19, passim.
arguing for a logical reorganization of the doctrinal categories of preemption and subsumation of
all types as species of conflict.
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or the structural relationships we denominate federalism. 104 Somewhat
surprisingly, given the detailed doctrinal inventory of types of preemp-
tion that the Court has a tendency to recite in preemption cases, 08 the
Court has not confronted some of the most subtle, and ultimately criti-
cal, questions that arise in determining whether preemption of a partic-
ular state law should occur.
If a primary condition precedent to displacement of state law is
that it must be determined to be "to the Contrary" of a governing fed-
eral principle, we must attend to the possible meanings of the phrase.
Dictionaries from the period of the founding and from the present day
both recognize "opposite" as a primary meaning of "contrary," 00
which seems to imply that not just any type of difference or conflict
between two laws will suffice. As additional synonyms, the dictionaries
list "repugnant" and "conversely," and specify that the comparison re-
sulting in the proper use of the word "contrary" may be as to purpose
or effect. 10 7 Applied to the preemption arena, two statutes that seek
opposite objectives, as in a federal nondiscrimination statute and a state
racial segregation statute, should be interpreted as inspired by opposite
purposes, and also likely to result in opposite effects, thus warranting
displacement of the state law.
The lexicological sources also suggest a tonal nuance to the type of
differences that are properly deemed "contrary." The Oxford English
Dictionary expresses this point by explaining that with regard to per-
sons and their actions, to be contrary means to be "antagonistic," "ac-
tively opposed ... hostile."108 More generally, a contrary is "diametri-
cally different, extremely unlike."'0 9 In light of the tonal nuances, we
104. The rote recitation at the outset of many preemption decisions that the Court will pre-
sume "Congtess did not intend to preempt state law" is insufficient. The Court often recites the
presumption without any effort to employ it and has yet to elaborate how the presumption should
operate within traditional preemption analysis.
105. See supra note 103.
106. See 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 844-45 (1989); SAMUEL JOHNSON. A DICTIONARY
OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1760) (under "contrary"; pages are not numbered).
107. See 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 844-45 (1989); SAMUEL JOHNSON. A DICTIONARY
OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1760) (under "contrary"; pages are not numbered). The distinction be-
tween purpose and effect continues to play a vibrant role in the Court's preemption jurisprudence.
See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238 (1984).
108. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 844 (1989).
109. Id. A logician would define contrary in a narrower manner, without the hostility or an-
tagonistic aspects of the lexicologist. In logic, the relationship of a contrary is represented by the
two propositions "All X is Y" and "No X is Y." Precisely the same terms are at issue and the
property asserted in each statement is diametrically opposed-a complete and perfect opposite of
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might conclude that for a state law to be held contrary to federal law,
the state law must evince a hostility toward or antagonistic effects on
the federal goals. Implementation of this approach would constrain the
types of differences that produce supplantation of state law. Only if the
federal legislation sought to achieve national uniformity and exclusiv-
ity, or complete deregulation of an industry or market, would state law
be ousted simply for regulating in the area.
But these total exclusions of state regulatory power, whether ex-
press or implied, are relatively rare. Most federal preemption questions
do not present a situation of logical contraries, where the feds say "not
A" and a state responds "A!" Rather, the types of conflicts presented
for adjudication are more subtle. The Supremacy Clause does not ex-
pressly answer when differences, although not constituting logical con-
traries, are sufficient to displace state law. It does not speak to whether
the relative importance to a state of its challenged law may be permis-
sible in analyzing the law for proscribed conflict. It is silent on whether
the judicial duty should be described as one of harmonizing the two
sovereigns' statutes or whether the task is to construe and compare the
statutes with no presumptions favoring preservation of state law. More
generally, then, whether the Clause should be read-as Chief Justice
Marshall read it-to bar any state law "interfering with or contrary
to" federal law,110 is a question of values rather than one of neutral
textual explication. Answers to these subtle questions posed by the
Clause must seek illumination beyond the text alone.
3. Substantive "Supremacy Clause" Claims
Can a textualist interpretation of the Clause clarify whether any
substantive claims are properly founded on the Supremacy Clause?
Under decisional law, two sets of Supremacy Clause "claims" have
been recognized. The first set, founded upon the theory and pronounce-
ments of McCulloch v. Maryland,111 forbids the states from interfering
with or impeding, or in any fashion attempting to regulate, the conduct
of the federal government. 1 2 As we have seen,'a the justification Chief
the other. "Two propositions are said to be contraries ir they cannot both be true, though they
might both be false." IRVING M. CoPt. INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 156 (4th ed. 1972).
110. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I. 210 (1824) (cmphasis added). See supra notes
49-55 and accompanying text.
I!1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
112. See id. at 436; see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
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Justice Marshall proffers in McCulloch is not textualist but essentialist;
he inquires as to what properties and powers are essential incidents of a
supreme national government, thereby generating the federal govern-
ment's immunity theoretically from virtually any state action.
Under the first set of Supremacy Clause claims, at least three sub-
stantive claims 1 4 have been recognized pursuant to McCulloch's elabo-
ration of the Supremacy Clause's central meaning. Held to be
"Supremacy Clause violations" are the following: first, attempts by a
state to regulate directly a federal entity or instrumentality;'" second,
attempts by a state to discriminate against the national government,
including those it employs or with whom it does business;" 6 and third,
efforts by a state to discriminate against people asserting rights arising
under federal law. 1  Yet however reasonable these proscriptions of
state action appear, it must be questioned whether they are properly
tethered to the Supremacy Clause. Certainly the text of the Clause
does not explicitly support Marshall's embroidery. Moreover, his essen-
tialist jurisprudential method, by which the constitutional text becomes
merely an occasion for generating new constitutional proscriptions
against state regulatory power on the basis of what powers a nationally
supreme government ought to have,"" cannot be justified in terms of
the particular text or the federalist principles undergirding the larger
document. If Marshall's method and the principles thereby achieved
must be rejected, these three substantive claims can no longer be
grounded constitutionally absent some other rationale.'"
The second set of substantive claims denominated "Supremacy
Clause claims"'' 2 0 provide a remedy for improper state law interference
with governing "laws of the United States." These claims, whose most
114. "Claims" is used here in an original sense, as in a cause of action that is pleaded and if
established will justify judicial relief.
115. See. e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990); Goodyear Atomic Corp.
v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988); United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285
(1963).
116. See Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
117. See Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S.
230 (1934).
118. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
119. See infra part IIL.A for a different textual foundation for these claims.
120. The Court employs interchangeably for preemption claims the terms "Supremacy Clause
cases," see supra note 5, and "Supremacy Clause claims," see, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982); Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497
(1978).
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explicit doctrinal root is Gibbons v. Ogden, 2 ' hold that the federal law
that may preempt inconsistent state law may be found in treaties, 22
statutes, 123 federal common law,1 24 and administrative regulations.126
Preemption claims enjoy a somewhat more secure textual warrant than
do McCulloch-based theories because the Clause specifically states that
federal law shall be the "supreme Law of the Land," a state's law "to
the Contrary notwithstanding." But is the Clause itself properly the
source of the claim, or is preemption better understood as a claim aris-
ing under and secured to the particular body of federal substantive law
that is urged to be preemptive? Could it be that instead of serving as a
primary source of generative constitutional principles, the Clause is
empty of any substantive content that can give rise to substantive
claims for relief? That it functions primarily as a rule of decision,
rather than as a source of substantive claims? These ideas suggest a
theory of the Supremacy Clause that contrasts sharply with the vision
of the great Chief Justice. Yet such a theory may be both more coher-
ent and more faithful to the constitutional structure, including the val-
ues of citizen dialogue and political participation requisite to a self-
governing polity, which are best achieved at the state and local govern-
ment levels. 126  Further support for an alternative theory of the
Supremacy Clause can be gleaned from the historical records of the
founding. But as we shall see, that authority, like the text itself, ulti-
mately leaves several critical questions unanswered.
121. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
122. See. e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880) (treaty provision concerning
aliens' inheritance rights prevails over inconsistent state law disqualifying aliens from inheriting):
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 199 (1796) (Treaty of Peace between U.S. and Britain displaces
state law concerning confiscation of British subjects' property).
123. See. e.g., English v. General Elec. Corp., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co..
435 U.S. 151 (1978); Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
124. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). reh g denied. 489 U.S.
1047 (1989).
125. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 US. 57 (1988); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 485 U.S. 141
(1982).
126. See Michelman, supra note II, at 1531. Professor Michelman argues that citizen partici-
pation in discussing and resolving the public issues of the community perhaps exerts greater influ-
ence for political change than formal political structures.
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II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Under the Articles of Confederation, the states ceded to the na-
tional government certain expressly stated powers and reserved the bal-
ance. 121 The document described the relationship as a "league of
friendship," 128 which well depicted the union's type of influence: it de-
pended upon comity and forbearance to achieve compliance with its
policies and possessed no police power or system of courts separate
from .those of the states to enforce its law. Hence, the young nation
rather predictably ran into some significant difficulties,' 2 9 often sug-
gested to be attributable to a lack of sufficient central power.1 30 The
nation's finances were unsteady, resulting in frightening dependence
upon European loans, and some state legislatures had overtly rejected
Treaty of Paris' 3 terms that renounced all claims to damages resulting
from the war.'3 2 By 1787, even antifederalist republicans conceded the
127. Article II of the Articles of Confederation expressly limited national power: "Each state
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assem-
bled." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 11 (1781).
128. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 111 (1781); see GORDON S. WOOD. THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 355 (1969).
129. For example, Jefferson and Adams found it difficult to negotiate commercial treaties be-
cause European nations generally considered the former colonies' government, such as it was, to
be unstable. See MERRILL D. PETERSON, TIIOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 306-07
(1970). Under the Articles of Confederation, the states lacked a common currency and permitted
several currencies from foreign nations, plus coins and unbacked paper monies from various states,
to constitute legal tender. The unstable monetary structure impaired both interstate and intrastate
commercial activities. Further, congressional attempts to grapple with public exigencies via powers
not expressly conferred were easily and frequently blocked, for the Articles required unanimous
approval of such measures. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1781). The central gov-
ernment also lacked power to tax the people directly, which necessitated dependence upon the
states to satisfy the requisitions ordered by Congress. See id. Requisitions for money, soldiers, and
supplies often went unheeded by the states. See ALLAN NEVINS. THE AMERICAN STATES DURING
& AFrER THE REVOLUTION. 1775-1789, at 626 (1969).
130. Max Farrand discovered that the earliest and most frequent criticism of the Articles that
appeared in extant correspondence was "lack of power" in Congress. As he noted, this is an im-
precise complaint. We do not know whether any commentator who expressed his concern this
globally was motivated by a specific congressional deficit, as in a lack of financial power or certain
forms of military power, or the inability to compel the states to comply with the laws of the
United States including treaties, or yet other disabilities. See Max Farrand, The Fedeial Consti-
tution and the Defects of the Confederation, 2 AM. POL. Sd. REV. 532, 535-37 (Nov. 1907-Nov.
1908). In light of the document that emerged from the Convention, we can surmise that all of
these points were raised, but we cannot ascertain the intensity or breadth of concern among aver-
age citizens.
131. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and his Britannic Maj-
esty, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80-83 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris].
132. See WOOD, supra note 128, at 457-58; NEVINS, supra note 129, at 644-52.
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intolerable "weakness of the Confederation, 13 3 thus removing the last
obstacle blocking Congress' call for a national convention that would
propose amendments to the Articles. Instead of acting pursuant to this
limited directive, however, the gathering chose to read its mandate
broadly and begin anew, ultimately becoming a constitutional
convention.
Though many knowledgeable citizens apparently agreed that some
amendment of the existing charter of government was imperative, they
did not concur on either the diagnosis of the confederation's structural
problems or the proper treatment of those problems. Antifederalists
"were not poured out of one democratic mold, any more than the Fed-
eralists represented a unitary point of view about how to strengthen the
central government.113 4 While all Convention delegates, and indeed
most citizens of the day, fashioned themselves "republicans," wide vari-
ations in defining the specific content of that political concept and its
favored governmental structures undermined early attempts at achiev-
ing consensus.13 5 Even close friends and political compatriots like
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison agreed some amendments to the
Articles were warranted, but disagreed over the pivotal danger posed
by the fundamental question of central governmental power and hence
over the degree of power to be vested in the national government.
While Jefferson's watchword was "power tends to corrupt," Madison
perceived jeopardy for the central government to lie in "an insufficiency
of power." '136
133. As one New York antifederalist opponent of the Constitution stated during the ratifica-
tion battle in that state, "It is on all hands acknowledged that the federal government is not
adequate to the purposes of the Union." See WOOD, supra note 128. at 471. Max Farrand con-
cluded that the American people's "experience... of poor government, amounting practically to
misgovernment, under the Articles of Confederation" led to the Constitution. See Farrand. supra
note 130, at 544.
134. Richard B. Morris, The Confederation Period and the American Historian, 13 Wxt &
MARY Q. 139, 155 (1956) (citation omitted). And indeed, in 1787, republicanism and democracy
were not congenial political theories. See Arnold A. Rogow. The Federal Convention: Madison
and Yates, 60 AM. HisT. RE v. 323, 335 (1955); see also Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism
Useful, 97 YALE LJ. 1663, 1668-69 (1988) (arguing that patriarchy and slavery coexisted com-
fortably with republicanism in the American Revolutionary War period).
135. Forrest McDonald has distinguished several strands of republicanism that existed during
the decade preceding the Constitutional Convention. See McDoNALD, supra note 100, at 70-77
(nonideological and ideological republicanism, the latter divisible into agrarian and puritanical
strains). But see generally GORDON S. WOOD. THE RADICAUS.M OF TiE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
96, 99 (1992) (arguing that republicanism "stood for something other than a set of political insti-
tutions based on popular election." It cohered around a consistent set of values and was "a form of
life" (quoting Franco Venturi)).
136. See Rogow, supra note 134, at 334. Madison apprised Jefferson of the Constitutional
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In preparation for the Philadelphia Convention, which commenced
its deliberations in May 1787,111 James Madison studied histories of
political confederations, both ancient and modern, and formulated an
initial proposal that contained some features that were consistent with
the Articles, but that unquestionably sought a greatly strengthened na-
tional government. 138 Although a rudimentary federalism lay at its
base, with state boundaries and some state governmental authority in-
tact, the new national government would enjoy the authority to operate
directly upon individuals, in taxation and in other matters, rather than
simply upon state governments. 39 Madison sought to construct a na-
Convention's deliberations and decisions through frequent correspondence to Paris, where Jeffer-
son was serving as Minister to France. Jefferson eventually approved of the Convention's final
product but his first reaction was less than positive. He confessed to John Adams that the Consti-
tution contained "things ... which stagger all my dispositions." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
John Adams (Nov. 13, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 350-51 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1955). Jefferson believed that the confederacy needed to be strengthened but that this objec-
tive was best achieved in "three or four new articles to be added to the good, old, and venerable
fabrick"-the Articles of Confederation. 12 id. In particular, he would have added a federal
power over commerce, some ability to tax, and a separate executive and judiciary. See PETERSON,
supra note 129, at 359. Thus, he initially viewed the proposed Constitution to envisage a central
government that was far too powerful.
Madison generally placed greater emphasis than Jefferson on authority and property rights,
and less emphasis on majority liberty. In light of these rather fundamental philosophical differ-
ences, and in recognition of the wide veneration of Jefferson's intellectual abilities and integrity
during the Revolutionary War period, it is intriguing to speculate about the type of document that
might have emerged had Jefferson been present at the Convention rather than engaged in foreign
service. As a member of the Continental Congress, Jefferson was present during the drafting of
the Articles of Confederation but only in the most marginal sense. While capable of being a one-
man "legislative drafting bureau," id. at 112 (quoting Julian Boyd), Jefferson primarily took notes
of the drafting and debate proceedings rather than participating in them more directly. See Id. at
97; see also DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME: JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 243-44
(1948). His inactivity owed to his sense that because independence from English rule had been
declared, the fundamental governmental project lay in the creation of the states' constitutions, not
that of the loose union. Id. at 244-48. Thus, Jefferson was deeply disappointed to have been sent to
Congress in 1777, and his primary attention while there was drawn not to the national issues at
hand but to the drafting of proposed articles for the new constitution of Virginia, Despite the
grueling schedule of congressional committee meetings late into the evenings, Jefferson used his
remaining wakeful time drafting and corresponding with his legislative colleagues back in Wil-
liamsburg about the state constitutional project. See PETERSON, supra note 129, at 97-100.
137. A previous, abortive attempt at amendment was held in Annapolis in the early spring of
1787. With only 5 of the 13 states present, the delegates declined to initiate substantive discus-
sions on amendments. Alexander Hamilton proposed to those attending that a second meeting be
called for Philadelphia and that requests for attendance be sent to all absent states. At the latter
meeting, all states except Rhode Island sent delegates. See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 557-59 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION].
138. See 3 id. at 20-23 (Madison notes).
139. See 3 id. at 538-39.
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tional government that was unquestionably the constitutional superior
to the states, but also one that could effectively maintain in practice a
sovereign position over the states without recourse to force. 140
Although Madison considered various strategies, he ultimately fa-
vored vanquishing state power by conferring upon Congress an express,
unrestricted power to veto state laws. He identified the federal govern-
ment's inability to nullify "contradictory" state legislation as one of the
central failures of the Articles.1 41 As Madison informed both Jefferson
and Washington in correspondence prior to the convention, he advo-
cated assigning to the President or Congress-he had not yet chosen to
vest the proposed veto in Congress alone-a "negative" on state legisla-
tion "in all cases whatsoever."1 42 His conclusion, however, did not pro-
ceed simply from the proposition that the national government must be
able "to guard national rights and interests against invasion."143
Madison promoted dichotomous legal treatment of the two policy areas
in which the new government would act. The first area comprised cer-
tain topics upon which national uniformity was essential, including
"regulation of trade [and] fixing the terms and forms of naturaliza-
tion." 144 Over these subjects that require uniformity, the central gov-
ernment would rightfully possess "positive and compleat authority,"' 40
and the states would have no concurrent powers of any type. But over
the other policy areas, those that might be deemed rather remote from
national needs and thus properly committed to the state governments,
Madison believed it was "absolutely necessary" for the national govern-
140. In a letter to George Washington dated April 16. 1787, Madison describ,-d his quest:
Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable
with their aggregate sovereignty; and that a consolidation or the whole into one simple
republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for some middle
ground, which may at once support a due supremacy or the national authority, and not
exclude the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful.
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787). in TilE ANn-FEDERALIST
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 32 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (em-
phasis added) [hereinafter THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS]. See also Rogow, supra note 134. at
332.
141. See Rogow, supra note 134, at 329 (quoting Madison).
142. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 2 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 326 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1902) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF JAMaES MADIsOJ. See
also Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787). In 2 WRIrTNs OF JAMES
MADISON, supra, at 346.
143. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), In 2 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 326-27.
144. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16. 1787), in 2 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 345.46.
145. Id.
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ment to have a negative, or veto, power. 146 He likened the veto to that
previously "exercised by the Kingly prerogative," 47 and considered it
"the least possible encroachment" on state power that would protect
the nation.' 48
In his letter to Washington, Madison offered three reasons to jus-
tify a national veto power over state laws. 49 In each set of rela-
tions-vis-A-vis the nation, other states, and its own citizens-state
powers merited restraint. First, the positive powers granted to the na-
tional government would be "evaded & defeated" without granting it a
"defensive power" that permitted it to protect its province from the
states.150 Second, without some mechanism of central control, the states
would continue on their present path of "harass[ing] each other with
rival and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views of interest.""'
Finally, states had evidenced an astonishing propensity for trampling
the rights of minorities and individuals, and for promulgating unwise
policies. Thus, the national government, being "sufficiently disinter-
ested," could serve as the needed "dispassionate umpire" to protect re-
publicanism and promote wise local policy. 52 From Madison's perspec-
tive, evidence abounded that none of these were merely abstract or
hypothetical fears.' 53
While Madison's proposed congressional veto is correctly under-
stood as the initial Convention model for the Supremacy Clause, it was
not a novel approach for the time. Aspects of this proposal had been
advanced and accepted previously in other forums. During the period
146. Id. at 346.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. These views were extended and corroborated by his essay written in April 1787, Vices of
the Political System of the United States, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at
361-69.
150. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 346.
151. Id. In his letter to Jefferson, Madison urged that a method must be devised to "restrain
the States from thwarting and molesting each other." Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Mar. 19 [18], 1787), in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 327.
152. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 346-47.
153. Other delegates endorsed Madison's perception that the practice of floating numerous
issues of unsupported paper currencies was an attempt to satisfy the unpropertied majority at the
expense of the wealthier minority. This predictable excess of democracy was to be restrained via
central power, whose control would be structurally vested in the propertied classes. State-to-state
conflicts during the Articles' tenure included battles over boundary lines and commercial trade,
2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 361-69; see also CURRIE, supra note 22, at
175-76.
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between the signing of the peace treaty with the British and the Con-
vention, a number of state legislatures had interposed state law obsta-
cles against the treaty's full implementation. 1" In particular, British
creditors continued to find their debt collection efforts impeded and To-
ries faced renewed seizures and confiscations of their property. 5 5 Be-
cause the young nation lacked courts of its own, any relief had to be
pursued in and conferred by the state courts. But would the state
courts recognize as legal injuries violations of the United States' treaty
with England to the derogation of their state law? The states, after all,
generally had either legislatively authorized the putatively wrongful
confiscations, or had not adopted the treaty's terms as part of their
domestic laws. Thus, one might conclude that the law applicable to
Tory confiscations did not conceive of the activity as a legal wrong with
a remedy.
But in 1784, Alexander Hamilton, a talented nationalist lawyer,
mapped a path out of the state law labyrinth. In defending a Tory
charged with trespass, Hamilton reached out to the treaty, the law of
nations'56 mandating its respect, and to the Articles of Confederation
to supply the appropriate decisional rules. He acknowledged that state
law normally governed citizens, but contended that when dealing with
matters concerning foreigners-whether in legislation or adjudica-
tion--"each state must adopt the laws of Congress ... [which] must
prevail. ' 157 And where treaty provisions arguably govern a matter, the
state judges "must of necessity be judges of [the] United States."' 8
Hamilton asserted that he offered the only approach that guaranteed
that the legislature of any one state could not repeal a law of the
154. See NEViNS, supra note 129, at 644-52.
155. See WOOD, supra note 128, at 457-58. The states' legislative obstructions were allegedly
violations of Articles IV and VI of the Treaty of Paris. But the American negotiators, knowing
they were not empowered to agree to terms that impaired the states' sovereign legislative powers.
only agreed to attempt to gain the states' agreement on certain matters. See Treaty or Paris.
supra note 131, at art. V. ("It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the
legislatures of the respective States, to" provide, inter alia, restitution to certain British subjects).
By contrast, Article VI of the Treaty mandated no future prosecutions or confiscations of property
held by British subjects. See id. at art. VI.
156. Notably, at this time the law of nations governed only the relations between the goern-
ments proper, and not the relations between private parties of nations, except to the degree such
intercourse was made a subject of a treaty. Thus, Hamilton's argument was indeed creative. For
Hamilton's notes for argument in Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1785). see I TIE LAW
PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 353-60 (Julius Gocbel. Jr.
ed., 1964) [hereinafter LAW PRACTICE].
157. LAW PRACTICE, supra note 156, at 351.
158. Id.
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United States. 159
In Hamilton's argument, we see conjoined the ideas of national
legal supremacy on matters of national interest and the obligation of
judges, through the power of judicial review of state legislative acts, to
set aside any contrary state law when ruling on these national subjects.
The Congress had thus far not been presented with, nor taken a posi-
tion on, the technical legal question of what law governed the resolu-
tion of private party disputes arguably within the scope of the Treaty of
Paris of 1783. Thus, when Hamilton urged these principles upon the
state court, he characterized them as a matter of logical and legal
necessity.
In 1786, however, Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay sought to
remedy the lack of an explicit rule concerning the authority of federal
legislation. He requested Congress to ratify through express legislation
the propositions Hamilton had advanced. Jay reasoned that the "thir-
teen independent sovereign states" had expressly delegated
a general though limited Sovereignty for the general and na-
tional purposes specified in the Confederation. In this Sover-
eignty they cannot severally participate (except by their Dele-
gates) nor with it have concurrent Jurisdiction. . . .When
therefore a treaty is constitutionally made,... it immediately
becomes binding on the whole nation, and superadded to the
laws of the land, without the intervention, consent, or fiat of
state legislatures. 160
The rules of decision to be applied in such cases, even in disputes be-
tween two private parties, were the "rules and maxims established by
the laws of nations for the interpretation of treaties."' 61
To protect the keen national interests, Jay advised a formal enact-
ment that would explicitly disavow as ultra vires state legislative at-
tempts to construe the meaning of treaties, and their purported author-
ity over any aspect of treaty operation. 6 2 Further, he recommended
that Congress declare that states should repeal all statutes currently in
159. See id. at 351-52.
160. 4 U.S. CONTINTENTAL CONGRESS, SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
CONGRESS 330-31 (1820) [hereinafter SECRET JOURNALS].
161, 4 id.
162. See Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration
of Independence and the Meaning of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 Am. HIST. REv. 511, 531
(1925).
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force that purport to exercise this authority.16 3 Finally, Jay submitted
that the state acts of repeal should imply, if not expressly command,
that the state courts should seek the intent of the treaty when its mean-
ing was drawn into question, "anything in the said [state] acts or parts
of acts ... to the contrary... notwithstanding."'" This language, of
course, foreshadows quite closely that of the Supremacy Clause. Con-
gress did not disappoint its foreign affairs secretary; only a few months
after he presented his report, it passed resolutions endorsing all of Jay's
positions concerning treaty interpretation and enforcement under state
law. Congress disseminated its resolutions to the state legislatures
before the Constitutional Convention gathered in late May 1787.115
As a representative to Congress under the Articles, Madison was
directly confronted with the concrete political and diplomatic difficul-
ties that had arisen because separate state and federal sovereignties at-
tempted to exercise control over the same legal matters. He had also
been exposed to arguments favoring implied national legal exclusivity
over those subjects committed to the national government. While these
were essential points to be maintained in a new union structure, from
Madison's point of view they were ultimately not sufficient; the restric-
tion of national legal power solely to national subjects failed to redress
the entire range of state governmental excesses and poor judgment. 66
163. Id.
164. See 4 SECREF JOURNALS, supra note 160, at 336 (emphasis added). Professor Edward
Corwin apparently was the first to discuss the legal significance for state and local law or Hamil-
ton's and Jay's separate arguments concerning treaties. He provides a more detailed discussion of
these and the other arguments that led eventually to certain foundational principles of the Consti-
tution. See Corwin, supra note 162, at 529-32.
165. As Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson wrote Foreign Secretary Hammond to elaborate
the nation's compliance with Congress' instructions. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Hammond (May 29, 1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF THO.AiS JEFFERSON 551-60 (Charles T. Cullen
ed., 1990). Jefferson reported that almost all states had complied promptly and completely. For
example, in one significant opinion, the North Carolina court held "the confederation or all the
States ... is to be taken as a part of the law of the land, unrepealable by any act or the General
Assembly." Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C. (Mart.) 5, 7 (1787). In correspondence contemporaneous
with the case, James Iredell, plaintiff's attorney in Bayard and later a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, clarified his argument. It was not that he believed judges had a general power to
overturn state legislation. Rather, it was merely a question or applying the proper rules of deci-
sion. Where a case presented a conflict between the national constitution-"thefindanenial. un-
repealable law"--and a state act that is "founded on an authority not given by the people, and to
which, therefore, the people owe no obedience," the judicial duty is clear judges simply determine
which law is superior and apply it. Iredell believed this power to be inherent in the nature or
judging, an exercise of power that is "unavoidable." WOOD, supra note 128, at 461 (quoting
Iredell).
166. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
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During this period, Madison reposed his trust in a national Congress to
decide what other errors in state policy merited reversal.16 7
Madison preferred to vest Congress with an unrestricted veto
power over state laws, and would have swept within its purview policies
that were core concerns of the states, such as defining the rights of
property holders. Although many of Madison's proposals were ad-
vanced by the Virginia delegates, his position here was not endorsed
and advocated in the Virginia Plan.16 8 The delegation's language re-
stricted the congressional "negative" to those state laws "contravening"
the Constitution." 9 Shortly after Governor Randolph presented their
proposal, the Convention approved in principle the congressional nega-
tive, as amended to include treaties as a part of the authoritative na-
tional law.170  Somewhat surprisingly, it passed with virtually no
debate. 17'
167. See ADRIENNE KOCH. JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 34-39
(1950). Madison did not espouse these nationalistic preferences for long; he and Jefferson became
promoters of "states' rights" and democratic republicanism. See id. at 198-207; see also Rogow,
supra note 134, at 332.
168. The Virginia Plan was presented and elaborated by Governor Edmund Randolph in a
speech on May 29, 1787. In describing the character and properties the national government
should possess, he stated the government ought "to be able to defend itself against incroachment.
. and to be paramount to the state constitutions." I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 137, at 18 (Madison's notes).
169. Randolph formally proposed the congressional veto as a portion of the sixth resolution
advanced by the Virginia delegation. It stated:
[T]he National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested
in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the sepa-
rate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the sev-
eral States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of
Union.
I id. at 21 (emphasis added). In Robert Yates' version of the day, Randolph "candidly confessed
that [the resolutions] were not intended for a federal government-he meant a strong consoli-
dated union, in which the idea of states should be nearly annihilated." I id. at 24.
170. The resolution was approved on May 31, 1787. 1 id. at 47. The amendment to include
treaties was authored by Benjamin Franklin, who moved that the negative be permitted not only
where state laws contravened the articles of Union, but also "any Treaties subsisting under the
authority of the union." I id. Franklin, of course, was one of the three Americans who had negoti-
ated the Treaty of 1783 with England, which had been frequently denied the status of binding law
in the various states. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
171. Delegates continued to arrive, sometimes with momentous importance. For instance, on
June 2, 1787, three delegates arrived from three different states. I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 76. One of the new arrivals, John Lansing, transformed New
York's delegation into active stewards of states' rights republicanism. Prior to this date, New
York was represented by Alexander Hamilton and Robert Yates, who parted company on many
issues, which occasionally rendered the state unable to cast a vote. See I id. at 32 (equally divided
vote recorded). Modifications in states' votes on particular issues such as the congressional veto of
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Perhaps because of the ease with which the resolution passed, one
week later Charles Pinckney moved to reconsider the earlier restrictive
resolution. In its place, he moved that the national legislature should
have the power "to negative all [state] laws which to them shall appear
improper." ' Madison likely had felt himself honor-bound not to initi-
ate amendments to the Virginia Plan that had issued pursuant to a
joint agreement of the Virginia delegates, even on a point he so ear-
nestly believed essential. But he could second another delegate's
amendment, and did so, offering an extensive set of reasons justifying
the broad power. He also utilized evocative astronomical imagery to
presage the imminent destruction of the country if the amendment was
not passed. The veto would create one unlimited supreme power which
"is the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal ten-
dency of the States; . . . without it, [they] will continually fly out of
their proper orbits and destroy the order and harmony of the political
system. 1 73 Madison also raised the specter of military force being re-
peatedly required to bring the states back into harmony should the un-
restricted veto be denied. 4
It had been difficult for committed states' rights advocates to per-
mit the veto of state laws even for the narrow reason of constitutional
contravention-but this they had accepted as the price of union and as
part of the appropriate powers of a central government. But allocating
to Congress a state-law veto that could be exercised for any reason-or
by implication, for no reason-was anathema. Those delegates who
tended to be solicitous of state power correctly understood the proposal
to be motivated by a desire to strip the state legislatures of all remain-
ing sovereign power. They responded to Madison's imagery concretely,
stating arguments familiar to contemporary students of federalism.
These delegates feared the resulting order (or rather, disorder) if the
states lacked an internal police power and control over the state militia,
and believed the broad veto would enhance the already overweening
power of the large and populous states.17 Moreover, they contended,
state law is likely attributable to the debates, as well as to shifting representation. See also I Id. at
21-22 (quoting PA. J. & WKLY. ADVERTISER, May 19, 1787, listing the delegates whom had been
named by each state and noting which had arrived); I id. at 22-23 (quoting a letter from George
Mason detailing that only five states were fully represented as of May 20. 1787, and that "the
members drop in slowly").
172. 1 id. at 162.
173. 1 id. at 165 (Madison's notes); see also I Id. at 169 (Yates' notes).
174. See I id. at 165 (Madison's notes).
175. 1 id. at 165-68 (Madison's notes).
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no new territories would join the union if all independent power were
lost upon statehood. 7 8 In sum, they expressed the view that a national
legislature with such a power would enslave the states.'" Given the raw
nerve he had exposed, Madison should not have been surprised when
the Convention rejected the proposal by a decisive margin of better
than two to one.17 1
In light of the seemingly resolute opposition to vesting the national
legislature with plenary power over state law, the subsequent events of
July 17, 1787, are nothing less than astonishing. After approving gen-
eral principles on which national legislation should proceed, 179 the Con-
vention resumed its reconsideration of the sixth resolution, of which the
veto formed only a part. The veto provision had not been modified since
being approved on June 8; it permitted the national legislature to "neg-
ative" all state laws that, in its opinion, "contravened" the Constitution
or treaties thereunder. Yet, at this third discussion, new opposition sur-
faced. 180 Madison's responsive discourse on the importance of reposing
a defensive power in the Congress may have quelled some fears but it
176. See I id. at 166. Mr. Gerry also suggested that new states formed from the territories
might arise to control the original states via the unrestricted congressional veto. I Id. at 173
(Hamilton's notes).
177. 1 id. at 165 (Madison's notes on Elbridge Gerry's speech).
178. See I id. at 163 (official journal). Only Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts voted
in favor of the amendment-the three wealthiest states and each the most powerful in their re-
spective geographical regions. South Carolina's delegation declined to support Mr. Pinckney,
yielding the final tally of seven against, three in favor, and one state divided. I id. Each state was
granted one vote, which accorded with the principle governing the Continental Congress (see AR-
TICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 4) per decision of the Convention at the outset. See
I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 8 & 15 (official journal), 17
(Madison's notes reaffirming prior rule).
179. The Convention agreed that Congress should be authorized "to legislate in all cases for
the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the states are separately incompe-
tent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individ-
ual legislation." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 21 (official jour-
nal). The Convention had previously rejected placing a restriction upon Congress' power to
interfere with the states' police power, see 2 id., with Governor Morris identifying specifically
states' currency practices as a power that merited infringement. See 2 id. at 26 (Madison's notes).
180. Three prominent delegates voiced concerns. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania pre-
dicted that states would find the present language offensive and believed the potential problems
would be resolved if positive legislative authority were conferred upon Congress. Roger Sherman
of Connecticut thought the resolution conferred power that was already implied and therefore was
superfluous: "the Courts of the States would not consider as valid any law contravening the Au-
thority of the Union." Luther Martin of Maryland was opposed in principle and because of the
resolution's impracticality. He viewed the power sought for the Congress to be "improper and
inadmissable [sic]" and queried, "Shall all of the laws of the States be sent up to the Gen'l
legislature before they shall be permitted to operate?" See 2 id. at 27 (Madison's notes).
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fomented new criticisms of the veto: "[A] law that ought to be nega-
tived" was properly the province of the judiciary, not the Congress.
Should "that security fail," the improper state law could be implicitly
"repealed" by enacting a national law on the subject. 181 Moreover, the
congressional veto was predicated upon the "wrong principle, to wit,
that a law of a state contrary to the articles of the Union, would if not
negatived, be valid & operative." 182 The resolution failed, garnering
approval of only three states.
Presumably, at this juncture the states' rights advocates should
have been relieved and self-satisfied, and become dormant. Yet the next
extant entry records the proposal of one of their leaders, Luther Mar-
tin, who was attorney general of Maryland and an eventual nonsigner
of the Constitution:
that the Legislative acts of the U.S. made by virtue & in pur-
suance of the articles of Union, and all treaties made & rati-
fied under the authority of the U.S. shall be the supreme law
of the respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall
relate to the said States, or their Citizens and inhabitants-&
that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of
the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.183
The resolution passed unanimously.184 Unfortunately, Madison was
181. 2 id. at 28 (Gov. Morris' comments) (Madison's notes). This comment would seem to
suggest that the delegate considered the matter resolved with no recourse to the judiciary neces-
sary once Congress enacted legislation that implicitly "repealed" the offensive state legislation.
The delegate failed to foresee the subtlety of the preemption questions that would arise, or the
need for an authoritative interpretation of the federal law's impact on state and local law.
182. 2 id. (Sherman) (Madison's notes).
183. 2 Id. at 28-29.
184. Despite having initiated this critical compromise, Luther Martin sidesteppzd discussion
of both the substance of the provision and his midwifery at its birth when he gave his extended
report on the Constitution and the Convention to the Maryland legislature. See 2 id. at 172-232
(reprinting Martin's speech). Given that the Supremacy Clause is Martin's only contribution to
formulating the specific textual language of the Constitution, his refusal to claim credit for the
provision tends to confirm the magnitude of popular dissent over approval of the Clause. Indeed.
Martin concluded his legislative presentation by claiming disingeniously that "I gave [the pro-
posed Constitution] every possible opposition, in every stage of its progression. I opposed the s)s-
tern there with the same explicit frankness with which I have here ...." 2 id. at 231. Martin's
misrepresentations, including his origination of the Supremacy Clause, were publicly revealed by a
fellow delegate. See 2 id. at 273. Martin's weak attempts to explain and excuse his involvement
were also published, and are reprinted in 2 id. at 287. Interestingly, Martin later defended Mary-
land's legislation aimed at taxing the second Bank of the United States when McCulloch reached
the U.S. Supreme Court. See McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 371 (1819).
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both the only notetaker of the debates this day, and, undoubtedly, also
actively engaged in defending the foundational principle he had first
advocated. His notes suffer from the dual commitment, recording only
the substance of Martin's proposal and none of the delegates'
discussion.
Despite this void in the historical record, monumental differences
between the Martin substitute and the previously endorsed Virginia
Plan resolution are discernible. First and most obviously, Martin's pro-
posal shifted from the legislative branch to the judiciary the responsi-
bility for ascertaining and securing state fidelity to national law. Sec-
ond, the new resolution explicitly cloaked only federal treaty and
statutory law within national supremacy. 185 Under the new language,
whether by oversight or intention, judges were not authorized to nullify
the operation of a state law that failed to comply with the federal Con-
stitution itself.186
Even excluding the omission of unconstitutionality, which was
later corrected without opposition,1 87 the importance of these changes
cannot be overstated. When the Convention approved Martin's resolu-
tion, it did not simply substitute a different institution to perform the
same function. Rather, the shift concomitantly transformed the nature
of the question: a state's fidelity to federal law was no longer destined
to be a discretionary legislative decision but rather a judicial one. Ow-
ing to certain features of the judicial power, the Convention's shifting
of this responsibility to the courts 88 implicitly conveyed many impor-
tant assurances to the states. States were guaranteed that, first, they
would have a forum in which to defend their laws; second, where a
state law was set aside, reasoned explanation for the decision would be
required; third, the acceptable reasons for displacement would be cir-
185. Note that Martin's substitute accorded "legislative acts" supremacy over contrary state
law. Given the preeminent importance of common law in 1787, the resolution's omission of the
more inclusive terminology of "laws"-is striking, for its author was a prominent attorney and state
attorney general. That phrasing was a later development. See infra note 193 and accompanying
text.
186. See supra text accompanying note 183. Hence, Forrest McDonald has erred in stating
that Martin's substitute resolution included the Constitution within the sources of law entitled to
national supremacy. See McDONALD, supra note 100, at 255.
187. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 381-82, 389 (official
journal and Madison's notes).
188. At this time a separate federal court system had not yet been approved, though the Vir-
ginia Plan proposed a federal judiciary in its ninth resolution. See 2 id. at 21. The resolution
(redesignated number 11) was discussed and approved in principle on July 18. See 2 Id. at 37
(official journal).
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cumscribed; fourth, the federal legislative acts empowerd to displace
state law would themselves be consistent with the legislative power con-
ferred by the Constitution;189 and fifth, review of an unfavorable initial
decision would be available.
Both the Martin substitute and the Virginia Plan's recommenda-
tion were less nationalistic than the Madison-Pinckney proposal.
Madison's approach did not require reasons to be offered for rejecting
the state law, and rejection could even have rested upon an objective
that was otherwise unconstitutional.190 Neither the Virginia Plan nor
Madison's proposal required any sort of external verification of a state
law's unconstitutionality according t6 impartial norms; the veto could
be exercised on the basis of arbitrary judgment or disagreement with a
state's policy choices, 91 and could have been motivated by unconstitu-
tional reasons or effected obviously unconstitutional outcomes. When
they earlier approved the Virginia Plan's approach to the veto, the dele-
gates apparently did not apprehend its elasticity that in practice would
have led to the broad scope permitted by Madison's formula.1 92
Between Martin's substitution for the Virginia Plan's veto and the
current Supremacy Clause lay a number of small but highly significant
steps. The Committee of Detail, which fashioned the first Convention
draft of the Constitution from the approved resolutions, detected the
glaring omission of unconstitutionality as a reason to displace state law.
Its initial solution was to draft a separate provision vesting the Su-
preme Court with sole power to decide such questions.93 The Commit-
189. As noted above, initially these reasons were limited to inconsistency with a congressional
act or a treaty; constitutional inconsistency was added later. See supra text accompanying note
187.
190. For instance, a state's law governing the conduct of elections might have been vetoed
strategically, just in time to eliminate the state's electors from participating in choosing the Presi-
dent, so as to secure the election of a President congenial to Congress. As this tactic would evis-
cerate the people's exercise of their sovereignty by electing their own representatives, it could be
said to negate the federal government's guarantee of a "Republican form of Government." See
US. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. See generally Merritt, supra note 90 (examining the Guarantee Clause
as a restraint on federal power to interfere with state autonomy).
191. Recall that the resolution's language stated the congressional negative of state laws to be
available when, "in [its] opinion," the state law contravened the national Constitution. See I
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 47 (official journal).
192. Contemporaneous materials do not suggest that judicial review of Congress' opinion on
unconstitutionality of state legislation would be available. Given the express language reposing
discretion in the legislative body ("in [its] opinion"), it is difficult to argue that judicial review
was contemplated.
193. "All laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void, and in the decision
thereon, which shall be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents without which the general
principles cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general principle." 2 RECORDS
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tee, however, eventually chose not to include this new provision in its
final draft document. Instead, after the Committee had reported the
document to the full Convention, one of the Committee members rec-
ommended that the Martin language formerly approved be amended to
include unconstitutionality.19 4 The lack of opposition to adding the
Constitution as part of the supreme law suggests that its prior omission
was an oversight.
With the judicial negative of state laws firmly established, the
faithful friends of the congressional veto raised their proposal one last
time, observing that its language and the protections it offered to states
differed from their last version.1"5 They now queried whether a legisla-
tive supplement to the judicial remedy should be authorized, and sec-
ond, as one supporter viewed it, whether a remedy should be available
at the central government level rather than only in the offending state
via its judiciary.1 96 While the latter point in particular raised an issue
critical to the effective functioning of federal law, 197 the concern might
have been allayed by mentioning Supreme Court appellate review, and
hence supervision of, the state court decisions. But the extant notes do
not record any suggestion that the delegates mentioned federal appel-
late review over state decisions as the mechanism by which ultimate
federal control would be asserted. Nevertheless, given the Committee
of Detail's earlier scuttled provision, it is clear that at least some dele-
gates believed that via the Supreme Court, the national government
would be involved in these decisions, whether as an original matter or
by appellate review. Madison's question of whether effective national
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 144 (Committee of Detail, draft no. 4, in
Edmund Randolph's handwriting).
194. 2 id. at 381-82 (official journal). The Committee proposed this substitute language:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States
shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the constitutions or laws of the
several States to the contrary notwithstanding.
2 id. (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying notes 199-202 for a discussion of the Com-
mittee's other textual changes.
195. The text of this proposal differed somewhat from prior efforts. It provided an additional
power to be vested in the Congress to: "negative all laws passed by the several states interfering,
in the opinion of the Legislature, with the general interests and harmony of the Union-provided
that two thirds of the Members of each House assent to the same." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 382 (official journal).
196. 2 id. at 391 (comment by James Wilson) (Madison's notes).
197. Where available, central government review of some sort would facilitate uniformity of
law and assist in ensuring compliance with governing federal law.
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control could be asserted over allegedly unconstitutional state laws re-
mained either unanswered or unrecorded, 19a and his final attempt to
insert a congressional veto failed.
Four other textual changes preceded the final Supremacy Clause
wording. The Committee of Detail initiated an important emendation,
again unclear whether wittingly or not, modifying the phrase "Judiciar-
ies of the.. . States shall be bound" to "Judges in the several States
shall be bound." 199 This subtle change could have evidenced an inten-
tion to bind all judges, whether state or national, by the principle of
national legal supremacy.200 But the putative change in scope evidently
was never raised for Convention discussion, and it could easily have
been merely a transcription error in the midst of the Committee's mul-
tiple drafts. The Committee's substitute language included a second
subtle but significant revision. "Legislative acts" became the more ex-
pansive "Laws of the United States," 201 perhaps signifying that com-
198. Was this a strategic silence, so as not to endanger the implicit grounding of Supreme
Court review over state court decisions on fidelity issues? Was it understood that the jurisdictional
grant extended to these questions as part of the "arising under" grant, depending upon the deci-
sion of the first Congress on whether to vest the jurisdiction? Unfortunately, the answers to these
questions are not available. But we do have other evidence that at least Alexander Hamilton was
aware of the elasticity of the national powers. Hamilton's plan was to "squeeze out by interpreta-
tion whatever power was necessary to achieve an adequately energetic [national] government.-
Hamilton stated shortly after signing the Constitution: "A good administration will conciliate the
confidence and affection of the people, and perhaps enable the Government to acquire more con-
sistency than the proposed Constitution seems to promise .... It may triumph altogether over the
state Governments, and reduce them to an entire subordination, dividing the larger states into
smaller districts." Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Federalist-A Split Personality, 57 A t HIST
REV. 625, 643 (1952) (quoting from ALEXANDER HAMILTON. THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HA.IL-
TON 423 (1904)). With proper interpretation, the states would be "annihilated." I RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 297 (Yates' Notes). Given that the vote here was
very close (six to five), the best performance for the congressional veto, it is possible that the
delegates generally did not anticipate that national involvement on these questions, via appellate
review, would be available. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN0TION, supra note 137. at 382
(official journal). Although little debate on this issue was recorded, %%hat there is lacks discussion
of any concerns about permitting the validity of state law to be determined by political tides,
rather than by judicial standards.
199. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 183 (Madison's notes)
(emphasis added); see also supra note 183.
200. Forrest McDonald contends that the change in nomenclature from "Judiciaries" to
"Judges" excluded juries from any responsibility to be faithful to national law. See McDO.*ALD,
supra note 100, at 255. This position cannot be sustained as a legal matter because the jury
function is executed pursuant to constraints imposed by law, law that is interpreted and applied by
judges who are bound by the Supremacy Clause. The Clause expressly binds the pivotal play-
ers-the judges-and has no need to bind juries. The jury's province, moreover, does not encom-
pass legal determinations-which are manifestly governed by the Clause--but only those of fact.
201. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. supra note 137, at 381.
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mon law principles as well as statutory law would be subject to national
supremacy. Again, no records of any discussion exist. The third revision
amplified the temporal scope of the Clause; treaties approved under the
Articles of Confederation were expressly grandfathered, but prior fed-
eral statutory and constitutional laws were not. 02
The final changes were initiated by the Committee on Style and
Alteration. 0s It eliminated an introductory article originally proposed
by the Committee of Detail that might have become an independent
basis for generating principles of national supremacy and could have
undercut the explicit grants and implied proscriptions of power.2 04 The
Committee also condensed the verbose phrase "supreme law of the sev-
eral states, and of their citizens and inhabitants" to "supreme Law of
the Land. '205 This was more than a mere stylistic change, for the new
language swept within its scope the national government, including its
courts, which previously were not included. Regardless of their state or
federal identity, all courts would function under the same obligation to
enforce national law. Again, the records are mute on whether the Com-
mittee on Style's draft revision of the Clause provoked discussion at the
time the reorganized version of the document was reported or thereaf-
ter. This final Committee draft also gathered together into one article
the oath requirement for all governmental officials, whether state or
federal, and the Supremacy Clause, thereby creating most of Article
VI.2°6 The changes cumulatively produced the final wording and place-
ment of this centrally important clause. 207
202. 2 id. at 382.
203. Both James Madison and Alexander Hamilton were elected to serve on this Committee.
See 2 id. at 547 (official journal).
204. The Committee of Detail's draft of Article II1 stated: "The Government shall consist of
supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers." 2 id. at 177 (emphasis added) (Madison's
notes). By contrast, the final draft proposed by the Committee of Style mentions supremacy only
in Article VI. See 2 id. at 590-603.
205. 2 id. at 603.
206. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI. The first clause grandfathers debts incurred by the Continental
Congress as against the new central government.
207. Although the Convention produced a dramatically more powerful national government,
Madison and Hamilton were disappointed by the final Constitution's retention of significant state
powers. Madison wrote Jefferson in 1787 that the Constitution "will neither effectually answer its
national object," nor "prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts against the
State Governments." WOOD, supra note 128, at 525. "Madison's 'middle ground' [between state
and national governments in] 1787 was not the federalism of 1788, but meant rather 'a due
supremacy of the national authority' with 'the local authorities' left to exist only 'so far as they
can be subordinately useful.'" Id. Hamilton was also disheartened by the Convention's output.
See JOHN C. MILLER. ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 182 (1959) ("Few mem-
bers present found the plan of government further removed from their own ideas regarding the
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During the ratification process, those eventually known as antifed-
eralists highlighted the Supremacy Clause as proof of the drafters' hos-
tile attitudes toward the state governments. 208 They found it difficult to
conceive how the federal system structured by the proposed Constitu-
tion could safeguard significant state power and simultaneously pre-
serve national supremacy, and thus assailed the Clause's import glob-
ally.209 It seemed that creation of a national government concomitantly
required that the state governments be abolished; the Supremacy
Clause, in their view, secured that end.210 Consistent with the level of
kind of government the country needed than did Hamilton."); see also Id. at 162 (delineating
Hamilton's plan of making the states administrative districts of the central government).
208. See. e.g., 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 601 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) (Mr. Bloodworth of the North Carolina Ratifying Convention said the Clause appears to
"sweep off all the constitutions of the states. It is a total repeal of every act and constitution of the
states .... It will produce an abolition of the state governments."); THE ANTn-FEDERALIST PA-
PERS, supra note 140, at 243 (the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention minority said the Constitu-
tion seeks to achieve "one consolidated government, founded upon the destruction of the several
governments of the states"); id. at 244 (the Clause "may be exercised to the absolute destruction
of the state governments, without any violation .. . of the constitution"); Id. at 268 (quoting
letters in The Federal Farmer opining that if proposed Constitution were not modified. "the state
*governments must be annihilated or continue to exist for no purpose").
209. See. e.g., THE ANTi-FEDERAUST PAPERS, supra note 140, at 308 ("Brutus" argued the
proposed Constitution "was calculated to abolish entirely the state governments, and to melt down
the states into one entire government"); see also 4 THE FOUNDER' Co. SnTtio,, supra note
208, at 600 (Impartial Examiner No. I disputed the possibility that states can continue to operate
as governments if the Constitution is adopted, for "two sovereignties existing within the same
community is a perfect solecism").
210. In fact, Alexander Hamilton, among others, had espoused a principle drawn from Black-
stone. He contended that it was impossible to have two legislatures in the same state "without
falling into that solecism in politics of imperium in imperlo." See \Voov, supra note 128, at 352;
McDONALD. supra note 100, at 277. Although Hamilton later articulated a theoretical approach
that seemed to transcend Blackstone's critique, see THE FEDERAUST No 34. at 206-07 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), others remained unconvinced. Hamilton's reputed role
as a Framer of the Constitution merits brief comment. While he was elected a New York delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, his influence there can only be described as minimal. The overly
nationalistic tones of an early Hamilton speech only created more hostility to his cause, and he
subsequently left the Convention at the end of June, disillusioned with the prospects of achieving
an appropriately empowered national government. See generally MILLER, supra note 207, at 161-
63, 171-73, 176; see also I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIo., supra note 137, at 282-311
(extant notes of Hamilton's speech advocating vastly augmented national powers). At Washing-
ton's behest, Hamilton returned to Philadelphia but, even then, he was in the city only infre-
quently. To some degree, Hamilton proved influential in formulating the method of ratification
and its theoretical explanation, justifying the breach of the Articles' requirements for amendment.
See I id. at 560-61 (Madison's notes). And he, like Madison, was elected a member of the Com-
mittee of Style and Alteration, which reorganized the work product into the Constitution we have
today. See I id. at 547.
Hamilton's role should instead be understood and appreciated as that of a primary advocate
of the Constitution during the critical ratification process. The pseudonymously published Feder-
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discussion generated at the Convention, the extant comments during
the ratification process do not attempt to parse the Clause's legal
meaning or to suggest, other than in the global critique, its likely legal
import. None of the extant materials evidence that the Constitution's
opponents or advocates-even the Constitution's Framers-possessed a
rudimentary sense that determining when state law is "to the contrary"
of federal law might be problematic. The antifederalists' critical com-
mentary does not recognize that differences between national and state
law might be complementary and even beneficial, yet nonetheless result
in the displacement of state law. There is no suggestion, for instance,
that either the Framers ultimately intended, or that the antifederalists
feared, that concurrent legislative jurisdiction would constitute a legal
impossibility. 1' If lawyers and jurists of the period engaged in sophisti-
cated legal analysis of the Supremacy Clause, anticipating the interpre-
tive problems the Clause would generate, traces of these discussions
have thus far not been discovered.
Despite its ultimate inadequacy in answering contemporary inter-
pretive quandaries, the historical record is not moribund. At a mini-
mum, the Framers overtly rejected the proposition that state law could
be rejected for any reason, and narrowed the forbidden interaction to
that of being "contrary."2 2 Notably, even in the Virginia Plan's origi-
nal proposal, particular state law must "contravene[]" federal law to
warrant its displacement. At no time did the Framers endorse a weaker
interaction, such as "interfere with" or "impinge upon" federal law.
Consistently, the Convention expected a more egregious, if not hostile,
stance from a state as the predicate for displacing its law. Given this
exceptionally narrow reason for superseding state law, Chief Justice
alist Papers, first printed as New York newspaper articles, are justly prized as a distinctively
American contribution to political theory. Hamilton organized and largely authored these essays;
other essays were contributed by Madison and John Jay. But these essays' actual political influ-
ence extended only to the ratification process in New York and, to some extent, Virginia, where
copies of the essays in their original newspaper form were available. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS,
supra, at xi. Although New York was a critically important state geographically and politically,
the Constitution was ratified by nine states prior to New York's action. Thus, these essays played
no significant role in the initial adoption of the new charter, for it became effective regardless of
New York's decision. See John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 799, 814, 816 (1961).
211. During the first part of the twentieth century, the mere existence of federal law on a
subject was considered sufficient to expel the states from that legislative arena. See, e.g., Charles-
ton & W. Car. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) (Holmes, J.) ("When
Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand, [state law] coincidence is as ineffective
as [state law] opposition . . .").
212. See supra text accompanying notes 169, 172-78.
[Vol. 24:829
HeinOnline  -- 24 Conn. L. Rev. 874 1991-1992
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Marshall's attempt to tease out of the Supremacy Clause an unremit-
ting nationalism as the touchstone for constitutional interpretation 21 3
seems strained and unwarranted. The conditions governing legitimate
exercise of national power and preeminence cannot be found in the
Supremacy Clause itself but must be located in the balance of the
Constitution.
III. REFORMULATING THE LEGAL IMPORT OF THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE
Charles Black has observed that "[w]hen one proposes a new theo-
retical approach to a problem, one must face the fact the one's hearers
are likely to feel somewhat at sea. 21 4 The recommendation here, that
we rethink several constitutional principles that seem established and
workable, may initially seem to rock the constitutional boat unnecessa-
rily. I intend to establish that current Supremacy Clause jurisprudence
is conflicting and demands theoretical restructuring to attain logical
and practical constitutional coherence, and to enhance the republican
self-governing activities generally found, if found at all, at the state and
local levels.
Three broad aspects of current Supremacy Clause doctrine suggest
that this portion of the constitutional puzzle has been forced into posi-
tion. First are the plethora of Court decisions that recognize and refer
to "Supremacy Clause claims. ' 215 According to this view, the Clause
has a substantive dimension to which specific constitutional claims may
be tethered. As developed earlier, this category is composed of two ana-
lytically distinct sets of claims: those loosely based upon McCulloch
pronouncements, and those that allege federal preemption of state
law.216 The three McCulloch-based theories recognized for striking
down state law are: a state may not attempt to regulate the federal
government directly;217 nor may it discriminate against the national
government, including those it employs or with whom it does busi-
213. See supra text accompanying notes 21-61.
214. BLACK, supra note 66, at 48. This is an apt metaphor for one such as Black who has
devoted a portion of his scholarly life to admiralty law.
215. See supra notes 2-4, 111-26. Sometimes the terminology the Court uses is "Supremacy
Clause cases." See supra note 4.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 111-26.
217. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1986 (1990); Gomd)ear Atomic
Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988); United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285
(1963).
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ness; 218 nor may it discriminate against persons asserting rights arising
under federal law.219 According to one formulation, the governing prin-
ciple for preemption cases forbids state law from conflicting "with an
affirmative command of Congress. 220
In contrast, a second piece of the doctrinal puzzle 'emerges from
those cases where the Court rejects that "Supremacy Clause claims"
present direct constitutional challenges, and instead holds that these
claims are statutory in nature. For example, in Swift & Co. v. Wick-
ham,221 the Court identified a fundamental difference between preemp-
tion claims and those based upon "substantive provisions" of the Con-
stitution. It is true, the Court held, that ultimately a preemption claim
is "grounded in" the Supremacy Clause in the sense that "if a state
measure conflicts with a federal requirement, the state provision must
give way.''222 However, because the "basic question involved in these
cases ... is never one of interpretation of the Federal Constitution but
inevitably one of comparing two statutes, 2 2 3 the preemption claim
must be considered basically statutory.2 24 The underlying germinal the-
ory-that some claims are "truly" constitutional and others, specifi-
cally preemption claims, are not--categorizes preemption claims as
nonconstitutional according to the criterion it specifies; interpreting and
applying a particular constitutional heading is not part of the legal op-
eration.223 Unfortunately, the subsequent statutory constriction of
three-judge district courts to a narrow set of circumstances, 2 8 which
218. See, e.g., Davis v. Department of Treasury, 485 U.S. 803 (1985) (resolving question of
intergovernmental tax immunity).
219. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); McKnett v. St. Louis & S. Ry., 292
U.S. 230 (1934).
220. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 433 (1990); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). See also Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985). This formulation typifies the imprecision integral to preemption
doctrine. For example, preemption under a federal common law rule cannot be said to conflict
with "an affirmative command of Congress." See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487
U.S. 500 (1988). Implied preemption also fails to satisfy the precept.
221. 382 U.S. 111, 120 (1965).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. To be sure, this holding was limited to determining the propriety of convening a three-
judge district court, see id., but I believe the insight can be plucked from the case to inspire a
different Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.
225. This is not to say that the constitutional text is irrelevant to preemption determinations.
Rather, I argue that greater attention to the textual limitations embedded in the Supremacy
Clause is warranted in constructing the preemption decisional matrix, see infra text accompanying
notes 273-79, and will ultimately enhance the space available for participatory political activities.
226. The major burden on the Court-the direct appeal-was concomitantly reduced. The
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occasioned the Swift & Co. opinion, seems to have led the Court also to
believe that its insight about the nature of preemption claims was no
longer functional. This, we will see, proved to be a wrong turn.
The divergent conceptions and treatments of the various
"Supremacy Clause claims" remain apparent in some of the Court's
opinions, and have led to rather conflicting statements from the Court.
For instance, in a recent preemption case, the Court stated that, "It is.
. . axiomatic that 'for the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the con-
stitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of
statewide laws.' ",227 Yet in a jurisdictional ruling in a different preemp-
tion case, the Court observed that "appellant never challenged the [fed-
eral] constitutionality of the [state law]; rather it merely argued that
the [state's action] would violate the Supremacy Clause."228 Thus,
while the Court uniformly characterizes preemption claims as grounded
in the Supremacy Clause-assertedly a constitutional provision-and
denominates them "Supremacy Clause claims," 220  sometimes these
claims are considered "constitutional" in nature and other times not. 230
multifarious burdens the former three-judge district court provision placed on the Court were
conclusively exposed in a seminal article by Professor David Currie. See David Currie The Three-
Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U, CI. L. REV I (1964).
227. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, Ill S. Ct. 2476. 2482 (1991) (deciding that a
local regulation requiring a permit for the use of certain pesticides was not preempted by FIFRA)
(quoting Hillsborough v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
228. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 369 n.10 (1988). The Court
ruled that the case "was not the type of express challenge to the constitutionality of the state
statute required for this Court's exercise of jurisdiction under § 1257(2)." Id. Thus understood.
the Court dismissed the appeal and granted certiorari instead. Id.
229. The Court does not always explicitly invoke the Supremacy Clause in its preemption
cases. See Hoke, supra note 19, at 726-30. When it does, however, it types preemption as arising
under the Supremacy Clause.
230. Some readers might contend that the distinction between the two quotes accompanying
notes 227 and 228 evidences a view that preemption claims are properly classified as constitutional
when the complaint mounts a direct challenge to the state law, but are not when, as in Mississippi
Power, only a state's action pursuant to state authority is contested. This differentiation may assist
in curtailing the Court's appellate jurisdiction but is a hypertechnical and not particularly well
grounded distinction on which to construct a theory of the Supremacy Clause's mode of operation.
Accord Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN L
REv. 208, 209 n. I1 (1959).
Hypothesizing from the Mississippi Power comments, if a state's action is not ultra vires, and
is specifically directed by a state statute or regulation, it would seem that two options remain for
classifying the question. First, the Court's distinction could be employed and (so long as the plead-
ings did not attack the portion of the state statute that directed the action) the issue could be
considered a mere challenge to the state's action and not a direct challenge to its law. On the
other hand, the pleadings could instead attack the state statute or regulation itself for directing
that a state regulatory agency should engage in, for example, prudence reviews for utility com-
pany plans for construction of nuclear power plants, and request that the statutes purported inclu-
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To add to the complexities here, McCulloch-based claims 231 under the
Supremacy Clause are generally styled as constitutional challenges,
232
A third piece of the doctrinal puzzle adds yet another layer of
complexity into this analysis of the "substantive" character of the
Clause. The earlier textual and historical analyses of the Clause,233
along with the evaluation of its practical operation, lead to the appar-
ent conclusion that the Clause functions as a rule of decision for courts
deciding federal, or federalized,234 questions in both state and federal
courts. When, for example, the Constitutional Convention rejected the
proposed congressional veto and instead lodged responsibility for ensur-
ing state fidelity to federal law with the courts, the implicit conse-
quence was that the courts would use federal law as the rule of decision
where it applied. 235 The alternative, quite simply, would have been to
convert the Constitution and federal statutory law into a nullity as law,
into mere precatory instructions. While I do not want to belabor an
obvious point, federal law cannot be supreme except by its conversion
into substantive rules of decision.
Is it possible to sort out in some coherent fashion these divergent
doctrinal conceptions of the Supremacy Clause? The issue is not one
merely of the logic of the Clause in isolation, but of its larger func-
tional and structural fit within the balance of the Constitution as well.
Some might argue that it is possible to understand the Clause as func-
tioning both as a rule of decision and as the source of substantive
claims or fundamental values. Indeed, the Clause has operated in both
ways for almost 200 years. I believe, however, that this view is both
sion of FERC-regulated utilities be struck as a violation of the Supremacy Clause. A characteri-
zation of the claim in this latter fashion would have greater and clearer prospective effects should
the proponents of federal preemption win their cause, and thus would be a better litigation strat-
egy. But the mere distinction in pleading should not act to change our ultimate characterization of
the claim. Transported beyond the jurisdictional realm, the purported distinction is as murky and
unattainable as the long-sought definitive demarcation of "substance" and "procedure" for Erie
questions. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Cooperative, Inc.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
Interestingly, the Court has not employed the "action" versus "law" distinction when the
validity of federal "actions" (e.g., rulings by administrative agencies) is disputed. One might ar-
gue that the distinction appropriately leads to a more narrow view of what constitutes "laws of the
United States." See supra text accompanying notes 91-99.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 11 1-19.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 127-213.
234. See Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 98, at 805, 836.
235. And whether federal law applies itself constitutes a federal question. See Howlett v.
Rose, I10 S. Ct. 2430 (1990).
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internally inconsistent and mistaken. The fundamental role the
Supremacy Clause plays in the larger constitutional plan is procedural,
not substantive. In the remainder of this Article, I develop and argue
for this more restrictive, process-based approach to the Clause.
A. A Rule of Decision, Not a Source of Substantive Rights or
Claims
The Supremacy Clause may be said to have two distinct aspects.
The first delineates those categories of law that are entitled to
supremacy status.23 1 While this portion does not articulate specific legal
content, it does refer to and incorporate by reference all valid federal
law denoted by "[t]his Constitution and the Laws of the United
States. '2 37 The second aspect explicitly instructs judges to apply the
supreme law as the operative rules of decision, and to set aside any
contrary state law. It thus incorporates by reference the former de-
lineation of the supreme law.2 38 Thus parsed, the purpose of the Clause
is revealed to be precisely a rule of decision for federal and federalized
questions.
But where does this limitation bring us? Am I simply advocating
that the Clause be reduced to nothing more than another ultimately
meaningless constitutional truism? 23 9 Quite the contrary. My concep-
tion of the Clause is that it functions exclusively as a type of switch: as
to federal and federalized claims, the switch unquestionably operates to
require application of federal law, whether the claims are adjudicated
236. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " US. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
237. Excepting, of course, any federal law that is inconsistent with the Constitution. See Id.
("Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof"). For stylistic ease, I
omitted this condition from the first analytic step. As a practical matter, few federal statutes have
been held unconstitutional. Some notable recent exceptions are: Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (holding Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 unconstitutional for
violating separation-of-powers principles); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipaline
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), judgment stayed, 459 U.S. 813 (1982) (holding jurisdictional grant to
bankruptcy judges unconstitutional as inconsistent with Article IlI requirements).
238. "[A]nd the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." US. CoNsT. art. VI. cl. 2.
239. The Tenth Amendment was reduced to a truism in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 124 (1941); see also Weinberg, Federal Common Law. supra note 98, at 815 n.55. Martha
Field, Garcia v. SAMTA: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARA L REv 84 (1985).
Other scholars have reduced the Supremacy Clause to an equivalent status. See. e.g., GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION oF 1787: A COMMENTARY 196-205 (1989).
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in state or federal court.240 Analogously, pursuant to the federal Rules
of Decision Act 2 41 state statutory or common law governs an unfeder-
alized claim regardless of whether the action is adjudicated in federal
or state court.242 Of special import are those cases where the decisional
rule necessitated by a federal legislative act and that of a state both
seek to govern a given factual set of circumstances. If, according to
whatever criteria are' authorized, 4 3 the two are held in conflict, the
switch-the Supremacy Clause-requires that the federal rule of deci-
sion govern the question.
The benefits of this simplified conception of the Clause's impact on
state law are in part aesthetic-an attempt to bring clarity, order, and
coherence to a confused area of doctrine. Restricted to use as a switch
only, the Clause operates to enforce all federal constitutional and statu-
tory law according to whatever interpretive precepts and precedents
have been determined appropriate for those questions. More impor-
tantly, it thereby enforces the Constitution's "multiplicity of various
sorts of values, many in tension with each other: process values as well
as substantive values, structural and institutional values as well as
those embodying individual rights. 244 In applying the Supremacy
Clause, the entire Constitution and all constitutionally valid federal law
are entitled to the same dignity.2 45 The Clause does not function as a
source for generating additional qualifications for determining what is
the law of the United States,246 nor does it superimpose a separate set
of criteria for determining the internal relations among the competing
240. See Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2436 (1990). This principle includes the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988), which at times requires application of a state rule. The
operation of the Act remains disputed, especially in relation to federal common law. See, for
example, the extended debate between Professors Martin Redish and Louise Weinberg. See arti-
cles cited supra note 98.
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
242. This decisional governance is, of course, not monolithic; some cases present an admixture
of state and federal law. For instance, a substantive federal right to free expression can be joined
with a state statutory theory of recovery. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Trustees of Boston Univ., No.
86-0201-CV (Mass. App. Ct. May 9, 1986).
243. See infra text accompanying notes 285-88. One might ask whether the courts are under
any general duty to harmonize the two systems' statutes, or to seek "direct and positive conflict"
or look for a "clear statement" as to Congress' intent to preempt.
244. Bator, supra note 9, at 633.
245. Of course, in order to function as a rule of decision, the Clause requires that the federal
law be consistent with the Constitution.
246. The substantive and procedural provisions of the Constitution, and statutory and deci-
sional law, provide the sources for determining this question.
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values and principles of the Constitution. Rather, excepting only pre-
emption, 4 8 the Clause looks to the balance of the Constitution and fed-
eral law to supply, integral to themselves, the rules of decision for fed-
eral and federalized questions.
Under this conception, the Supremacy Clause does not provide the
basis for any substantive constitutional claims. The Court has virtually
granted this, most recently in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles (Golden State Transit II), where it held that the
Supremacy Clause, of its own force, does not create rights enforceable
under § 1983.249 It held that the Supremacy Clause is not a source of
any federal rights, but secures federal rights by according them priority
whenever they come into conflict with state law.2 10 As support for its
ruling, the Court cited Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion,251 where it held that the jurisdictional statute's reference to con-
stitutional claims "did not include rights secured solely by the
247. For example, the supposed Supremacy Clause principle that state law may not attempt to
regulate the national government supersedes congressional silence as to the import of state law on
the federal agency or instrumentality. This "constitutional" principle renders inoperable the Rules
of Decision Act, although it otherwise would be applicable. It can result in regulatory vacuums
because the state law is displaced and the federal law is silent on the question. See Susan Foote,
Regulatory Vacuums: Federalism, Deregulation, and Judicial Review, 19 U C DAVis L REv
113 (1985).
248. Under my approach, federal preemption of state law becomes simply a matter of which
substantive rule--state or federal-will be used to govern a given question. The Supremacy
Clause requires the predicate ruling that the state rule is "to the Contrary" of the federal in order
to displace state law and apply the federal rule. I argue that the criteria employed to determine
whether state law must be preempted are properly generated in part from the Supremacy Clause,
see infra text accompanying notes 270-86. This does not mean, however, that the claims should h-
characterized as Supremacy Clause claims. See infra text accompanying notes 276-86.
249. 493 U.S. 103, 107 n.4 (1989). See also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600, 615 (1979); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 124, 126-27 (1965). Chapman inter-
preted 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), the jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983, which provides jurisdic-
tion over civil actions "[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all parsons
within the jurisdiction of the United States." 493 U.S. at 107 n.4. In Golden State Transit 11, the
Court observed "that if the first prepositional phrase, referring to constitutional claims, included
rights secured solely by the Supremacy Clause, the additional language, providing for claims
based on Acts of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens would have been superfluous." Id.
(citing Chapman, 441 U.S. at 615). The Court concluded that "[t]he same is true with respect to
§ 1983. If the Supremacy Clause itself were understood to secure constitutional rights, the refer-
ence to 'and laws' would have been wholly unnecessary. It follows that a Supremacy Clause claim
based on a statutory violation is enforceable under § 1983 only when the statute creates 'rights,
privileges, or immunities' in a particular plaintiff." Id.
250. See Golden State Transit 1I. 493 U.S. at 107.
251. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
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Supremacy Clause.' '252 Unfortunately, however, the Court did not dis-
cern the utter inconsistency between the Chapman and Golden State
Transit II approaches. The Court must recognize that the Supremacy
Clause simultaneously secures all federal rights and creates no sub-
stantive federal right-none, that is, as an original matter. Rather, the
Clause constitutes the means by which all federal rights become en-
forceable law and assume priority over any contrary state law.
To actualize Golden State Transit I's insight into the purpose and
function of the Clause, each of the McCulloch-inspired claims must be
recharacterized as springing from some substantive aspect of the Con-
stitution, if they arise at all.253 The Court has already, albeit errati-
cally, led the way with one theory-the intergovernmental tax immu-
nity doctrine. While McCulloch positioned the doctrine squarely on the
shoulders of the Supremacy Clause, the Court has completely recon-
ceptualized the claim. In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,2 51
the Court recounted its theoretical shift that occurred in cases spanning
the latter New deal period to the present, noting that the McCulloch-
based doctrine "has now been 'thoroughly repudiated.' "255 The Court
specifically noted that "[w]hether such immunity shall be granted is
thus a question that 'is essentially legislative in character.' "2,50 Thus
intergovernmental tax immunity has become a question of statutory
preemption rather than a "constitutional" claim. Challenges to alleg-
edly burdensome state taxation may still be challenged under the Inter-
state and Indian Commerce Clauses257 but not under the Supremacy
Clause itself. While the Court has still not detached claims of discrimi-
natory taxation from the Supremacy Clause,258 Cotton Petroleum
traces the type of theoretical shift I advocate for each of the intergov-
ernmental immunity claims.2 59 By withdrawing Supremacy Clause
252. Golden State Transit II, 493 U.S. at 107 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 615 (1979)). The particular jurisdictional statute at
issue in Chapinan is quoted supra note 250.
253. 1 am assuming, arguendo, that the McCulloch-based "Supremacy Clause claims" war-
rant continued recognition, though I contend they must be recast in terms of the substantive
provisions of the Constitution.
254. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
255. Id. at 174 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 520 (1988)).
256. Id. at 175. (emphasis added) (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S.
342, 365-66 (1949)).
257. See id. at 176, 187-88, 191-92.
258. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
259. Indeed, we might view Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985), as another example, for the question for decision is analyzed in light of the substantive
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grounding, the claims must be justified under the substantive provisions
of the Constitution, including structural principles and values. The cur-
rent theory's implicit pressure to look first to the national government's
interest-as though it were coextensive with and representative of the
people's interests26 -would be stymied. New constitutional avenues
would be opened for rethinking the proper interrelation and boundaries
of the national and state governments.26
That the Supremacy Clause functions as a rule of decision rather
than as the source of substantive claims may not, at first blush, seem
the most exciting of insights. 6 2 But what is at stake is precisely the
balance of the Constitution as it speaks to federalism. If, like Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch, we take the Supremacy Clause as con-
clusive evidence of the Constitution's determined nationalism, a grudg-
ing view of state regulatory power will ensue.26 3 Further, if the Clause
is permitted to function as the textual basis of a superintending value
and objective of national preeminence, the interpretation of every other
federal constitutional power vis-.-vis the states will be vulnerable to
infection and distortion. Only if we reassess this nationalistic prefer-
ence currently fastened to the Supremacy Clause can we both return
the Clause to the function that is discernible from the text and struc-
provisions of the Constitution, rather than,conceiving of the case as presenting a "Supremacy
Clause claim."
260. See Richard Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U Ciii L REV. 335 (1990). But see
Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN L REV 29 (1986) (defending
virtual representation at the national level).
261. One of the avenues open for discussion is whether the claims should actually continue to
be conceived of as having constitutional dimensions, or whether, instead, other lower-level means
can vindicate the interests at stake. For instance, as to whether a state's worker-safety regulations
apply to a government defense contractor, if Congress has not spoken to the question would it not
suffice to presume-as a statutory matter-a congressional intent that federal entities operate
immune to state law? A rebuttable presumption, or a canon of construction incorporating the
established principle, would achieve the same end. Where Congress has spoken, construction of
the statutory text and congressional intent becomes the judicial task. Here, too, the Court could
fashion a rule of construction that doubts are to be resolved in favor of federal immunity. I am not
suggesting that I agree that we must continue to recognize intergovernmental immunities. After
all, they do operate as federal governmental immunities, rather than mutual intergovernmental
immunities. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 553-54.
262. See BLACK, supra note 66, at 45 ("Nothing, it may be, is drier than the discussion of
alternative grounds for holdings already reached.").
263. States have been pioneering many of the most promising regulatory efforts in the nation
during the past 12 years, encompassing, for example, civil rights, health insurance, consumer pro-
tection, and environmental issues. See, e.g., Robb London, Gay Groups Turn to State Couirts to
Win Rights, N.Y. TImES, Dec. 21, 1990, at B6; M.H. Freudenheim, States Try to Cut Cost of
Insurance for Medical Care, N.Y. TINIEs, Dec. 9, 1990, at Al. TransWorld Airlines v. Mattox,
897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990) (detailing state efforts to arrest deceptive airline fare advertising).
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ture-that of a switch-and take the supremacist thumb off the scales
when weighing state versus national power.
B. Legal Principles Inferred
While the Supremacy Clause is not properly the source of any
"claims" or of constitutional values, 6' it gives rise to an array of legal
principles. It is not my purpose to justify these principles, some of
which continue to inspire controversy, but rather to demonstrate that
the Supremacy Clause is not rendered sterile or nugatory under the
theory I have advanced.
My theory contemplates that when the federal and state regula-
tory regimes are headed toward imminent collision, the Clause func-
tions as a switch to permit the federal regime to proceed and to arrest
the state regulatory rule, thereby avoiding the collision. The switching
function is essential in any nation with a federal, as opposed to central-
ized, system of government. 215 Yet the Clause's legal import is not ex-
hausted as a switch. The absence of substantive claims flowing from
the Clause does not mean that it cannot provide a source of legal prin-
ciples that apply once claims are properly predicated upon other sub-
stantive legal provisions. From the Clause itself, we can extract the
principle that state courts are vested with the responsibility for deter-
mining state law compliance with the federal Constitution and with
otherwise valid federal law.266 We can also discern authority for state
court review of the constitutionality of federal statutory and regulatory
law; the Clause directs that to be valid, the federal rules of decision
must be "in pursuance" of the Constitution.267
264. As I have stated earlier, the Clause incorporates by reference and enforces the values
contained in the balance of the Constitution, but it does not supply any additional or independent
values. Otherwise, the nationalism said to be represented in the Supremacy Clause would demean
vertical separation-of-powers principles, generally known as structural federalism, and the objec-
tives federalism seeks to achieve. See supra text accompanying note 16.
265. Consider, by contrast, France, whose government structure abjures federalism in favor of
a highly centralized hierarchy. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR. THE ENDS OF FEDERALISm: NOTES To-
WARD A THEORY OF FEDERAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS 6, 13 (1976).
266. "[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound [by the Constitution and constitutionally
valid federal law], any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing." U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
267. For additional legal principles that flow from the Supremacy Clause's recognition of fed-
eral law as constituting the "Law of the Land," and thus, part of the law of a state, see Howlett v,
Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990). There the court specifically recognized "three corollaries" to this
principle. First, a state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties and the controversy
are properly before it, in the absence of a "valid excuse." Id. at 2439. Second, an excuse that is
inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse: the Supremacy Clause forbids state
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When read in tandem with other constitutional provisions, addi-
tional legal principles can be inferred, including some that are central
to the functioning of the national government. When joined with Arti-
cle III, for instance, the Supremacy Clause can lead to the postulates
that state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims, 2 63
and that the Supreme Court properly may exercise appellate review of
state decisions on the federal constitutionality of state law. These prin-
ciples are all regulative of federal power, and thus are process-based
rather than supportive of claims for relief; they come into play only
after some other nonfrivolous substantive claim has been pleaded to
gain entrance to judicial process.269
C. Preemption Is Not a Claim that Arises Under the Supremacy
Clause
Even if other "Supremacy Clause claims" are properly recast as
arising under substantive provisions of the Constitution, it may seem
that the claim of federal preemption of state law must remain tethered
to the Supremacy Clause. After all, the Clause is the only explicit con-
stitutional source of direction to judges to set aside any contrary state
law and apply federal law instead. As I will explain below, I agree that
preemption claims ultimately must retain a linkage to the Supremacy
Clause.170 But the argument that this linkage transforms preemption
claims into "Supremacy Clause claims" proves too much. The
Supremacy Clause is also at work in the background whenever any
substantive federal constitutional challenge is lodged against a state
law or action. Where a state has engaged in a warrantless seizure in-
side a residence, we would not conceive of a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge, either to the conduct itself or to a state law authorizing such
courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because they disagree with its content or bcause
of a refusal to recognize the superiority of its source. Id. at 2440. Third, when a state court
refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts, the
Supreme Court will act with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the
claim. Id.
268. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990). Tafflin v. Levitt.
493 U.S. 455 (1990).
269. While I have outlined some of the precepts that have been derived from the interrelation
of the Supremacy Clause and Article III, the Clause yields other legal principles via that interac-
tion. For instance, when read with Article 1, an oft-stated principle emerges, that "Congress has
the power to preempt state law." See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, I l I S. Ct: 2476,
2481-82 (1991); English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270. 2275 (1990); Northwest Cent.
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989).
270. See infra text accompanying notes 277-83.
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conduct, as a Supremacy Clause challenge. When we add the Swift &
Co. v. Wickham 71 recognition that preemption cases do not require a
court to construe and apply a substantive heading of the federal Consti-
tution,2 72 and thus in actuality cannot properly be considered constitu-
tional cases, we are forced to concede the necessity for reconceptualiz-
ing preemption claims.
The reconceptualization I advance employs the Swift & Co. in-
sight. The gravamen of a federal preemption question is an alleged con-
flict between a federal statutory27 or regulatory principle and a state
law274 or action. 5 Some nonconstitutional provision of federal law con-
stitutes the initial focus of the effort to determine whether a state law
provision is contrary to, or in conflict with, federal law; 27 6 the propo-
nent must identify the specific federal law alleged to be preemptive of a
specific state law. Minimally, then, judicial construction of the two sov-
ereigns' rules of law must be a part of the legal inquiry designed to
determine whether a state law conflicts with the federal rules and must
be displaced.
271. 382 U.S. III (1965).
272. See id. at 122-23.
273. A treaty that has been approved by two-thirds of the Senators present and ratified by the
President must "be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature . ... "
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). But see Louis HENKIN . FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 163 (1972) ("As an original matter, the equality as law of treaties and
federal statutes seems hardly inevitable."). Treaties thus can be tentatively classified as occupying
a status equivalent to statutes. The preemption complexities of treaties and various types of agree-
ments flowing from the foreign affairs powers are beyond the scope of this Article.
274. The potential targets of a federal preemption challenge may be found in state constitu-
tional, statutory, regulatory, or common law rules. See Hoke, supra note 19, at 691.
275. See, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) (invalidat-
ing as preempted a state attempt to undertake a "prudence review" of a utility's decision to build,
and its conduct during construction of a nuclear power facility); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v,
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986) (invalidating state attempt to restructure utility rates in a man-
ner that would impair FERC's allocation). For stylistic ease, I refer henceforth only to "state law"
as a term inclusive of a state action or course of conduct not expressly directed by a state statute
or regulation. Textually, of course, the Supremacy Clause authorizes only the displacement of a
state's law, not action.
276. Even "occupation of the field" preemption is better conceptualized as a species of conflict
between state law and governing federal law. When a federal act has expressly or impliedly ousted
all state regulation from a particular subject, a state law that seeks to regulate those subjects
conflicts with the federal law that demarcates the field. See Hoke, supra note 19, at 735-37. The
Court's demarcation of "actual conflict," see Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362
U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (dictum)), as merely
one particular type of preemption, rather than as the essential issue to be proved under any pre-
emption category-including field preemption-constitutes one reason its decisional apparatus for
resolving preemption questions simply cannot function.
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A federal preemption claim, therefore, need not be conceived as
arising under the Supremacy Clause. Rather, it arises under the spe-
cific federal law alleged to be preemptive of a state law. As such, it is
not a "Supremacy Clause claim," but a claim under other federal law.
This understanding is currently utilized, albeit unwittingly, under some
of the complex statutory schemes that seem endlessly to breed preemp-
tion cases. Under ERISA, 277 for instance, the Court does not intone
that a "Supremacy Clause claim" is presented.2 78 Nor does it charac-
terize as "Supremacy Clause claims" the ubiquitous cases that allege
theories of labor preemption. 7 While the Court tends to omit any
mention of the Supremacy Clause where an express statutory or com-
mon law principle is alleged to preempt the challenged state law, no
normative reason exists for not generalizing a statutory approach to all
preemption cases.
It might seem that embedded in this theory is a recommendation
that we jettison explicit references to the Supremacy Clause in preemp-
tion decisions, and understand the Clause to function merely as a back-
ground power enforcing federal law rather than as bearing any other
influence over preemption doctrine and methodology. This would entail
the abandonment of the Court's erratically applied preemption deci-
sional methodology 20 in favor of what might be conceived as pure stat-
utory construction. 28 ' But without some larger principles to guide pre-
277. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
278. See. e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
111 S. Ct. 403 (1990). Nor does it employ the preemption categories and typology enunciated and
applied in such ERISA preemption cases as Ingersoll.Rand Co. v. McClendon. Il l S. Ct. 478
(1990). In McClendon, the Court did not mention the Clause even though it employed the tradi-
tional preemption categories.
279. These three theories are derived from the federal common law of labor relations and
various federal statutory schemes, such as the Labor Management Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 185
(1988). See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.. 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (28 U.S.C. §
301 preemption); Lodge 76, International Assoc. of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (Machinists preemption); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (Garmon preemption).
280. See Hoke, supra note 19, 722-30 passim (criticizing this methodology). Others have
commented upon the Court's erratic doctrinal approach to preemption. See. e.g., William W.
Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975) (Supreme Court preemption decisions "take on an ad
hoe, unprincipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis").
281. By this term I mean the process by which judges construe statutes outside the preemption
context. Applied to preemption,' a judge would construe each statute and scheme independently.
and then compare their terms to discern any differences. Justice Frankfurter delineated part of the
preemption analytic project according to these norms. See Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety,
369 U.S. 153 (1962), overruled by Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) (ruling Kes-
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emption decision making, courts would likely interpret any differences
between the state and federal statutes as constituting forbidden "con-
flict," thus necessitating the displacement of state law.282 Though the
relative ease of application may have appeal, the centralizing, national-
istic prospects of this methodology should be deeply troubling.2 83
A straightforward statutory construction approach should not be
embraced as the panacea to the present chaos. It is not the required
implication of the earlier analysis that drew upon Swift & Co. and re-
jected preemption as a mode of authentically constitutional decision
making. 84 Only a hybrid approach, one recognizing that federal pre-
emption claims possess both constitutional and statutory dimensions, 28
will accurately capture the quality of the preemption inquiry. Under
this understanding, the limitations expressed in the Supremacy
Clause's text governing displacement of state law-chiefly, that the
state's law must be "contrary" to federal law-should be recognized as
a principal interpretive focus for generating the criteria and standards
ler's purported distinction between constitutional and statutory modes of preemption analysis was
ephemeral and ultimately unworkable).
282. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tal-
lentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232 (1986). But see California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272 (1987) (holding as not preempted for conflicting with federal law a state statute that accorded
more favorable treatment to employees who utilized pregnancy leave than Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by th Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
283. The approach admits objections both because of its nationalistic potential and claimed
ease of application. On the former, note that continued centralization of regulatory power will act
to eliminate the remaining vestiges of the states as law-making sources, and concomitantly under-
mine opportunities for meaningful democratic self-government. As for ease of application, the
monolithic approach to preemption conflict is too superficial. It fails to recognize that questions of
conflict between state and federal law may arise in at least four ways. The first situation occurs
when federal and state schemes have basically identical (or basically opposed) purposes and provi-
sions. For example, a state law mandating racially segregated public schools versus Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1964). Second, the federal and
state schemes have similar purposes but different provisions to address these purposes, as in the
state acts providing standards for the education of disabled children, which parallel the federal
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485 (West 1990). Third, the
state and federal schemes have divergent, but not opposed, purposes. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). Fourth, the fed-
eral and state schemes are concerned with completely different purposes and generally have no
interrelation except for intersection at some specific point or points. See, e..g., Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (intersection of state community property and federal military pay
laws). Only in the first is assessment of "conflict" relatively unambiguous.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 271-72.
285. Preemption has a constitutional dimension only because of the Supremacy Clause's rele-
vance to the process of a preemption inquiry. A preemption challenge does not constitute a consti-
tutional "claim," for it does not require construction and application of a constitutional provision,
but rather concerns federal legislation. See supra text accompanying notes 221-26.
[Vol. 24:829
HeinOnline  -- 24 Conn. L. Rev. 888 1991-1992
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
under which state law will be displaced. Judicial disregard of the limi-
tation ultimately promotes a unitary governmental and legal system
rather than a federal system, and retards the attainment of federalist
objectives.286 In place of the superficial incantation that preemption de-
cisions are "Supremacy Clause cases," respect for the text, con-
text-including structural federalism principles-and purpose of the
Clause should drive the decisional apparatus governing preemption
decisions.
Under my theory, then, preemption analysis should be understood
to have two parts. First, a preemption claim should be conceptualized
as a type of statutory claim that arises not under the Supremacy
Clause but under the particular federal act urged to be preemptive.
The conclusion as to whether a given state law is preempted depends on
a substantive evaluation of its "conflict" with the federal law. 81 Sec-
ond, determination of what counts as a "conflict" is something that
cannot be resolved merely through ordinary statutory construction.
Here the inquiry must remain ultimately tethered to the Supremacy
Clause. Only a lens based on our understanding of the text, context,
and purpose of the Clause, and a pragmatic understanding of what is
at stake politically, allows us to define what counts as a conflict be-
tween state and federal law.288
The lenses I advance for determining whether a state law provision
286. See supra note 16.
287. The conclusion that the state law is or is not preempted should therefore be expressed in
statutory rather than Supremacy Clause terms. In other words, a court should not hold "The
Supremacy Clause preempts ... " but rather that "[tihe federal Arbitration Act preempts the
Virginia consumer protection/fair notice statute from application to .... " E.g.. Saturn Distribu-
tion Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 727 (4th Cir. 1990) ("the Virginia ... Act is preempted by
the Federal Arbitration Act"); Associated Industries of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 283-84 (Ist
Cir. 1990) (Bownes, J.) ("[T]he Massachusetts [regulatory scheme is] not preempted by the OSH
Act and the OSH Standards.").
288. Under the Supremacy Clause, then, federal law may displace state law only when the
latter is in conflict with, or "to the Contrary" of, federal law. US COasr art. VI, cl. 2. Absent
conflict with governing federal law, the state law is empowered to operate and be enforced as 6alid
law because it issues from a governmental sovereign. I have elsewhere attempted to draw out the
implications of this principle for preemption analysis. Contrary to the Supreme Court's current
jurisprudence in the area, I argue that all types of preemption claims should be reconceptualized
as species of conflict. I divide the analytic preemption typology into three groups: impossibility of
dual compliance, incursion into an exclusively federal field, and significant impairment of explicit
federal objectives. See Hoke, supra note 19, at 735-37. In contrast, the Court currently conceives
of conflict as only one of the possible types of reasons for displacing state law, including in its
general inventory the following types of preemption: express vs. implied, occupation of the field vs.
actual conflict, physical impossibility, etc. See. e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493 (1989).
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must be displaced do not include Chief Justice Marshall's gloss that
mere interference with federal law sufficiently warrants preemption.
Identification of some interference with federal law only alerts us that a
preemption question has been raised; it does not and cannot suffice as
an analytic inquiry. Rather, in the absence of congressional purpose to
create at the national level a uniform regulatory scheme, whose bound-
aries should be interpreted to effectuate the express regulatory goals,
the courts should be directed to channel their interpretive energies to-
ward harmonizing the law of the two sovereigns into a functional
scheme. Only if the allegedly conflicting law cannot be blended into the
"single system of law" of which Henry Hart spoke289 should a court
displace state law. And in that latter step, it must identify precisely
what state law cannot be harmonized, seeking at all times to preserve
maximum state regulatory authority unless Congress has specifically
directed courts to develop and to protect an exclusively federal scheme.
This approach has embedded in its structure a healthy respect for the
creative judicial function and maintains fidelity to the constitutional
values underlying federal allocation of power.
IV. CONCLUSION
For most of this nation's history, legal scholars and judges have
accepted the Supremacy Clause as having both determinate meaning
and axiomatic constitutional import. During the recent past, efforts to
lift the curtain sheltering the national goliath placed one in the camp of
white supremacists who clung to the coded demand of "States' rights!"
Rightly, as between federal supremacy and white supremacy, no seri-
ous question could be entertained. The importance of the, issue, how-
ever, inhibited scrutiny of the legal norms by which national preemi-
nence was asserted.
We may now be at a point in our nation's history where the impor-
tance of issues of federalism may again be raised. Even in the area of
civil rights, it is no longer apparent that federal law will afford individ-
uals more protection than the laws of their states. More generally, the
nation and its political structure of power have undergone radical
transformation in the past thirty years. The sheer remoteness of the
national government to any substantive reality of self-government
would seem to require that we reassess the manner of determining and
enforcing national legal supremacy. Yet, endorsement of this republi-
289. Hart, supra note 7, at 489.
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can political critique is not an essential predicate for legitimating a re-
newed inquiry into the Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. Its
principles, encrusted with notions and precepts of supremacy drawn
from the nation's infancy, are inappropriate to revitalizing the federal-
ism at the base of the Constitution. Moreover, the principles and claims
appended to the Clause have not been reevaluated in light of the
Clause's primary function as a rule of decision. As presently conceived,
they are not faithful to the limitations imposed by the Constitutional
Convention that sought to preserve federal sharing of power. It is time
to unleash ourselves from the axiomatic premise that the Supremacy
Clause's meaning is self-evident and nonproblematic, and to revise its
interpretation to achieve both intellectual coherence and a self-gov-
erning polity.
HeinOnline  -- 24 Conn. L. Rev. 891 1991-1992
HeinOnline  -- 24 Conn. L. Rev. 892 1991-1992
